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Abstract: 
Alternative telecom operators have continuously invested in their own infrastructure in recent years. After more 
than a decade since liberalisation, competitive conditions have substantially changed, especially in urban areas. 
European regulatory authorities have acknowledged this development by starting regional deregulation. 
Additionally, different forms of cooperative investments in next generation broadband have appeared on the 
market. The effects of such schemes on competition, investment and welfare crucially depend on the fine details 
of implementation. For instance, in the case of joint-ventures, it matters how investment costs are shared and how 
internal and external access prices are determined. In the case of long-term access agreements, it is essential to 
consider how access tariffs are structured, whether they can adapt to market developments ex-post and whether 
contracts are signed before or after the investment takes place. Generally, many of these agreements allow some 
extent of risk sharing, offering the possibility to increase investment incentives when firms are not risk neutral. 
This article reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on geographic regulation and co-investments in next 
generation broadband. It is suggested that regulators consider introducing regulated co-investment agreements 
complementing current regulation or in some cases even substituting for it, in addition to considering 
geographically segmented access prices.    
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2369049 
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1. Introduction 
The continuous investment of alternative operators in telecommunications infrastructure in the years 
after liberalisation has led to increasingly differing competitive conditions across geographic areas. 
This is particularly the case in those network segments where alternative operators have invested; in 
national and regional backbone segments and also increasingly in local access directly connecting 
households in urban areas with next generation broadband. The latter investment may be seen as 
particularly valuable as high speed broadband has substantial positive spill-overs for the economy 
(Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012a) review relevant literature and estimates). Given that the 
regulators’ main objective is to ensure competition, uncertainty arises about whether a nationally 
uniform regulatory approach remains valid or whether some form of regional deregulation would be 
warranted. Positive spill-overs from investment for the economy may reinforce this uncertainty. In 
Europe  deregulation in dense, more competitive areas has accordingly increasingly been undertaken. 
The regulatory options a regulator has to implement this may range from regional full deregulation to 
access only obligations or forms of price regulation and will be reviewed in chapter 2 as well as their 
effects on competition, investment and welfare.   
In addition, firms as well as regulators seem to start to understand that network duplication, which 
traditional infrastructure competition has sometimes implied, is inefficient from a welfare point of view 
as investment costs are also duplicated. A natural solution is the use of cooperative investments 
whereby an infrastructure able to host both partners is rolled-out. Such co-investment schemes may 
also be used to distribute and share investment risk between the partners implying higher investment 
incentives, leading to higher quality broadband and more innovation. The presence of such co-
investment agreements increases the complexity of the assessment of competition and investment 
incentives substantially, as the details of such agreements matter. In particular, allowing some co-
investment clauses may be welfare optimal, while others may restrict competition too strongly (e.g. an 
high internal or external access price). Chapter 3 reviews the literature on cooperative investment in 
next generation broadband, considering the fine details of these mechanisms, as well as possible 
regulatory options such as the introduction of regulated joint-ventures in which the firm rolling out must 
offer the entrant the option to join it in a joint-venture at equal conditions
1
. The development of the 
literature on these topics is still a work in progress, as the introduction of regional regulation took place 
only around 2008 and large scale broadband co-investment agreements began only around 2009 – 
less than half a decade before this paper was written. Given the complexity of such agreements, many 
questions still remain open.   
Both geographic regulation as well as co-investments take place in a context of migration from legacy 
to next generation access (NGA) networks
2
. Traditional copper networks will be only progressively 
substituted by next generation infrastructure, and the regulation of both legacy and next generation 
infrastructure may affect this process and, in particular, investment incentives. Bourreau, Cambini and 
Hoernig (2012a) review the literature on migration. Most importantly, Bourreau, Cambini and Doğan 
(2012) find that regulated legacy access charges may affect investment in NGA in different ways. 
While an increase in the regulated access price to the new network in all cases increases investments, 
the effects of access prices associated with the legacy network are unclear. The authors show that 
with a high legacy network access charge: 
i) the entrants’ opportunity cost of investment is low, increasing its investment incentives 
(replacement effect) 
                                               
1
 A generic overview on the effects of access regulation on investment incentives is provided by Cambini and 
Jiang (2009). Also, a high-level review of the literature on geographic regulation, co-investments and migration 
may be found in  Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012a). 
2
 Also NGN, considering any type of next generation network not only related to access networks 
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ii) the incumbent risks to lose (or cannibalize) wholesale profits (wholesale revenue effect) 
from an investment (it is assumed that an entrant can more easily roll-out its own network 
infrastructure once the incumbent has deployed it (investment spill-over).  
iii) pressure on retail prices for legacy network based services is low. When the access price 
is low instead, as long as next generation services are seen as substitutes, the overall 
profitability of the investment is reduced (business migration effect).  
Overall, it is therefore unclear whether a relatively high legacy network access charge can increase 
investments in next generation broadband or not
3
. A high legacy access charge increases investment 
incentives of the entrant and sometimes those of the incumbent, potentially increasing dynamic 
efficiency, while negatively affecting static efficiency. The welfare maximising access prices a 
regulator should set in case of regulation of the legacy network are then shown to depend on the 
market environment and in particular on the amount of investment spill-overs (with high spill-overs the 
regulator would set a high access charge to counterbalance the negative effect it has on investments 
of the incumbent). Finally, when setting both copper and fibre access prices, these effects interact. 
Whenever a legacy network is present in the models reviewed, such migration issues are considered 
in some way. Most papers that will be analysed in this survey assume, however, given regulated 
marginal cost access to the copper network for all operators, implying absence of rent from this 
infrastructure minimizing distortions.   
This paper consists of two major sections that explore different theoretical issues related to the 
deployment and regulation of next generation broadband networks in Europe. Chapter 2 introduces 
geographic segmentation of regulation, reviews regulatory principles and practices in Europe as well 
as the theoretical and empirical literature on the subject. Chapter 3 describes different types of co-
investment agreements for the roll-out of next generation broadband networks in Europe and 
describes regulatory principles and practice. In addition, theoretical and empirical literature on the 
subject will be reviewed. Chapter 4 concludes the paper, and integrates ideas in the two prior 
chapters. 
2. Geographic segmentation of regulation 
The cost of rolling-out fixed access infrastructure is typically related to population density which in turn 
varies strongly across areas. Such geographic differences in investment costs may lead to 
geographically different market structures such as a higher number of entrants in urban areas. 
Increasingly competitive conditions in different geographic areas start to differ within European 
countries. As effective competition is the main objective of telecoms regulation, there is an ongoing 
debate about whether full or partial deregulation of geographic areas under increased competition is 
socially optimal. Since the liberalization of the telecoms market alternative operators are investing in 
their own network infrastructure.  This is especially the case with the roll-out of NGA infrastructure, as 
explained in the European Commission Recommendation on regulated access to next generation 
access networks
4
. Consequently, the coverage of regional alternative networks as well as their 
number has increased over time. Authors such as Cave (2008) argue that this must trigger a 
geographically differentiated regulation
5
.  
                                               
3
 Hoernig, Jay, Neu, Neumann, Plückebaum and Vogelsang (2012), a report for the European Competitive 
Telecommunication Association (ECTA), states that a high copper access charge reduces investment incentives 
focussing on the wholesale revenue effect. Plum (2011), a report for the European (incumbent) 
Telecommunications Network Operators (ETNO), instead states the contrary focussing on the business migration 
effect. 
4
 The 2010 NGA recommendation states for these cases that ―where the incumbent deploys FTTH, NRAs should 
in principle mandate unbundled access to the fibre loop. Any exception could be justified only in geographic areas 
where the presence of several alternative infrastructures, such as FTTH networks and/or cable, in combination 
with competitive access offers is likely to result in effective competition on the downstream level”. 
5
 In particular Cave proposes to distinguish three areas (―potentially competitive‖, ―probably monopolistic but 
where NGA investment can be commercially justified‖ and ―non commercial‖) regulated by principles of 
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While it is always difficult to draw direct inferences on the effects of regulation from the market 
outcome, it is convenient to describe some fundamental market characteristics at this stage.  
 
Download speeds via the legacy network (xDSL
6
) vary significantly across Europe (Figure 1). While 
the average xDSL speed in 2012 was 7.23 Mbps (around 35 Mbps for Cable and 37 Mbps for fibre to 
the home (FTTH)), speeds in Denmark were on average 11 Mbps while those in the Slovak Republic 
were 3 Mbps
7
. The major cause of slow DSL speeds is insufficiently upgraded backhaul networks. 
While on aggregate Europe scores well when compared to the US
8
, other sources show that 
comparisons with countries such as South Korea or Japan are less favourable
9
. While this may also 
be a consequence of different population densities or customer preferences it can also be the result of 
lacking investment incentives in higher speed access networks generated by access regulation and in 
particular also by geographic regulation (and co-investments) or its absence. 
 
Figure 1 – Actual xDSL Speeds in Europe (Source: Samknows, March 2012) 
We will see that pioneering NRAs in this field include Austria, Portugal and the UK. From the 
aggregate data these countries do not seem to have a particularly high or low performing broadband 
infrastructure when compared to other European countries. It should, however, be noted that such 
geographic deregulation efforts are relatively recent and concerning only strongly limited areas. Any 
impact on infrastructure investment at national level may therefore still be limited.  
 
It may be interesting to point out that overall broadband access prices do not seem to be higher in 
countries with higher xDSL performance on the market. Van Dijk (2012) shows for instance that at 
speeds between 12 and 30 Mbps prices in Italy and Ireland, where few infrastructure investments in 
xDSL seem to have taken place are also higher (around 43€ and 45€ per month
10
) than in Denmark 
and Finland (29 and 35€ per month) for the median offer. This also holds when comparing the least 
expensive offers in Italy in Ireland (around 26€ and 29€ per month) with Denmark and Finland (around 
24€ and 25€ per month). The same is true for lower speeds at 2-4 Mbps
11
. When comparing national 
population densities the picture is not coherent. For instance Finland has a very low population density 
(44 per sq mi) and Italy a very high density (512 per sq mi), while Denmark and Ireland have an 
intermediate density (333 and 153 per sq mi respectively). This suggests that it may be insufficient to 
compare nationally aggregate market outcomes. For instance population density in Helsinki is not 
                                                                                                                                                   
―forebearance‖, ―mandatory access to dominant NGA‖ and ―mandatory access to one or more collectively 
dominant NGAs‖ respectively.   
6
 xDSL describes all digital subscriber line based technologies such as ISDN, ADSL or VDSL. These are copper-
based. 
7
 Industry average speeds are not calculated for Europe 
8
 Actual download speeds  in the U.S. are 5.3 Mbps for xDSL, 17 Mbps for Cable and 30 Mbps for FTTH 
9
 Akamai (2012) 
10
 In €/PPP (VAT incl.), see p.116 and p.84 
11
 There is no data in this category for Italy though.  
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lower than in other capitals. Until recently only few disaggregated data was available. The increasing 
adaption of regulation to geographic market conditions and the will to support investments locally has, 
however, led to a recent increase of monitoring. The European Commission has asked Point Topic to 
map progress with next generation investments in members states and regions (30 mbps or above). 
Figure 2 shows NGA coverage in urban and rural areas. Overall NGA coverage seems to be highest 
in relatively dense countries such as the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium. At the same time 
these countries have historically strong cable competitors. In addition NGA coverage in rural areas is 
in all (large) countries significantly lower. This digital divide seems, however, still to be stronger in 
countries without a historical cable competitor.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – NGA coverage in Europe, total and rural areas (Source: Point Topic) 
The following sections will describe the regulatory principles at EU level guiding regulatory action in 
this field and regulatory practices implementing geographic segmentation of regulation. In a 
subsequent section the academic literature is reviewed.  
 
2.1. Regulatory principles in the European Union 
 
Geographical market analysis has always been a part of the European regulatory framework. It states 
that even if demand and supply-side substitution patterns may suggest a national market, sub-national 
markets can be defined when competitive conditions differ to a sufficient extent (e.g. urban and 
rural)
12
. This approach will be referred to as geographic segmentation of markets. In this case it is 
possible that the absence of significant market power of a firm or firms in a geographic sub-market can 
be demonstrated. In such cases, the regional market would then not be subject to any kind of 
asymmetric regulation anymore (full deregulation). Moreover, lighter remedies can be imposed in sub-
areas with stronger competitive constraints within an area where significant market power is found. 
This approach will be referred to generically as geographic segmentation of remedies. While it will be 
shown that the high flexibility with remedies means that technically this difference may not be of 
fundamental importance, the regulatory processes which lead to one or the other are – in Europe – 
                                               
12
 European Commission (2002), 56.: “the relevant geographic market comprises an area in which the 
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of the relevant products or services, in which area 
the conditions of competition are similar or sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighbouring areas in which the prevailing conditions of competition are appreciably different. The definition of the 
geographic market does not require the conditions of competition between traders or providers of services to be 
perfectly homogeneous. It is sufficient that they are similar or sufficiently homogeneous, and accordingly, only 
those areas in which the conditions of competition are „heterogeneous‟ may not be considered to constitute a 
uniform market.” 
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fundamentally different. Finally, the aggregate of both approaches will be referred to as geographic 
segmentation of regulation or geographic regulation.  
A series of national regulatory interventions regarding geographic segmentation of markets and 
remedies have been notified to the European Commission since 2008. While the European 
Commission currently has veto power on member states decisions on market analysis issues (i.e. in 
this context the definition of geographic markets), this is to date not the case on remedies (i.e. in this 
context the geographical differentiation of remedies).  
 
The BEREC Draft Common Position on Geographic Aspects of Market Analysis
13
 (2013) 
acknowledges the described market developments and sees an increasingly importance of 
geographically differentiated regulation in Europe. BEREC (2013) aims at giving European NRAs 
guidance on geographic regulation
14
 and follows an earlier Common Position of 2008.  
The Common Position states that NRAs should consider making a detailed geographical market 
analysis when some key indicators are present:  
 
- One or several alternative operators have significant but less than national coverage and exert a 
significant competitive constraint at the retail level in the areas where they are present  
- The incumbent operator differentiates retail prices geographically or the incumbent operator is 
setting a national uniform retail price but there are significant price differences between the 
incumbent operator and alternative operators where the latter is present; and 
- There are significant geographic differences in product characteristics 
The telecommunications sector consists of complex markets and technical products. For a detailed 
description of the markets and products analysed in the upcoming sections the reader may refer to 
BEREC (2010a). In recent years operators have been increasingly climbing the ladder of investment 
being able to replicate for example wholesale broadband access (WBA) products based on local loop 
unbundling (LLU). Also, in several countries independent alternative operator technologies (cable, 
FTTx, mobile broadband) are expanding rapidly allowing the provision of similar services. Provided 
that the described technologies are found to be retail product substitutes, indicators have to be 
analysed hinting to regionally different competitive wholesale conditions. The Common Position states 
that most likely candidates for segmentation are the WBA and leased line markets (wholesale 
services). Another likely candidate would be the market for physical access to the end customer
15
 
(essentially LLU).  
The Common Position distinguishes two types of countries. First there are countries - especially in 
Western Europe - where competition was mainly driven by LLU-based market entry and only partially 
by alternative infrastructures such a as cable (scenario 1). Secondly, there are countries - especially 
in Eastern Europe - where it is mainly driven by alternative infrastructures such as cable (scenario 2). 
Romania is an interesting example, as in the broadband retail market intense competition of the 
incumbent with cable operators is taking place. Today cable operators hold a higher share of the retail 
market than the incumbent. In addition there are regions where even two cable operators are present. 
The reason for this situation may be that the incumbent was slow to enter the broadband market and 
when it did, it did not enter aggressively (also because it has to offer uniform retail prices while cable 
operators are only present in urban areas). An additional reason may be that regulation on the 
incumbent was introduced only recently meaning that DSL-based competition was less aggressive 
than in other countries
16
. 
                                               
13
 BEREC (2013), public consultation version 
14
 A similar document has been product at OECD level (OECD, 2012) 
15
 Under the so called ―modified Greenfield approach‖ regulation on the market under examination is disregarded, 
but regulation on other (upstream) markets is treated as exogenous. I.e. an analysis of the competitiveness of the 
WBA market will consider LLU regulation to remain in place.  
16
 Informa (2011) 
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In case a geographical segmentation of the market is indicated the Common Position suggests 
choosing adequate geographic units. Generally there are two approaches: political/administrative 
boundaries or a network approach based on the topology of the incumbent operator. In any case, the 
Common Position states that the units should satisfy the following four conditions 
 
a. Mutually exclusive and less than national 
b. The network structure of all relevant operators and the services sold on the market 
can be mapped onto the geographic units 
c. Have clear and stable boundaries 
d. Small enough that the competitive conditions are unlikely to vary significantly within 
the unit but at the same time large enough that the burden on operators and NRAs 
with regard to data delivery and analysis is reasonable
17
. 
 
Homogeneously competitive areas should then be aggregated from the chosen geographic units. 
Homogeneity is judged essentially with the following criteria: 
 
a. The barriers to entry in the market 
b. The number of operators that exert a relevant competitive constraint on the SMP 
operator 
c. The market shares of the SMP operator and the alternative operators 
d. The prices 
 
Typically geographic areas in scenario 1 could, for instance, be defined as the areas covered by 
unbundled MDFs
18
 (e.g. UK WBA case UK/2010/1123 in Table 1). Depending on the extent of 
alternative parallel networks the segmentation could also be made based on the alternative networks 
topology or administrative geographic areas. In scenario 2, such areas could be based on 
administrative geographic areas (for example communes (e.g. Polish WBA case PL/2011/1184  in 
Table 1) or municipalities (e.g. Czech WBA case CZ/2012/1322). In addition, where a vertically-
integrated cable operator is present, the competitive effects on the wholesale market need to be 
considered only to the extent that they are relevant
19
.   
In practical cases, regulators often analysed whether the incumbent operator in a given area would 
have a market share below a certain threshold (e.g. 40-50%) and whether sufficient alternative 
infrastructures existed (number of players). More concretely the BEREC report on co-investment and 
significant market power (SMP) in NGA networks notes that ―a market characterised by two operators 
implies automatically that one of the players disposes of a market share of 50% or more and that it is 
therefore to be expected that a market with high entry barriers with one or two operators in the market 
raises concerns about dominance and more generally the competitive situation of the market.” 
Conversely, it is concluded that only markets with three or more independent operators can lead to 
effective competition in the physical access market in such an environment. An access market 
consisting of two infrastructures (e.g. incumbent and cable) is therefore generally not being considered 
to be sufficiently competitive. There are, however, various cases in Switzerland and France (usually as 
a consequence of co-investment) where three or more independent infrastructures currently co-exist 
(e.g. Basel, Paris, Zurich). In a full market analysis assessing the level of competition several other 
important factors next to the number of players, such as entry barriers, market shares, downstream 
                                               
17
 As noted in the Common Position, if the choice of a geographic unit that is too small may lead to a very 
significant number of units (even in the thousands). While the aggregation of geographic areas may contribute to 
solve part of the administrative burden derived from this fact, it is nevertheless a factor that may have to be 
weighted carefully by the NRA before deciding on the appropriate geographic unit.  
18
 Main distribution frames, in practice at the local exchange facility.  
19
 Whether technologies are retail substitutes and whether they can indirectly constrain the wholesale market 
under consideration in case no wholesale product is offered (e.g. Cable) needs to be analysed in detail. See also 
BEREC report on self-supply, BEREC (2010b).  
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competition, indirect effects and commercial or regulated wholesale products (e.g. often not given for 
Cable) would need to be assessed, however.  
As has been shown sub-national geographical markets are defined in case they are indicated by 
demand and supply side substitutability analysis or in case of sufficiently heterogeneous competitive 
conditions. The resulting sub-national markets must in turn be sufficiently homogeneous and have 
stable borders themselves. Typically, the Common Position states, geographic market segmentation is 
applied when an national regulatory authority (NRA) believes that some (non SMP) areas are 
competitive enough to fully withdraw regulation. Finally, it should be noted that possible closing of 
redundant traditional local exchanges (MDF) during the migration to NGA network may have 
consequences on the geographical market definitions.  
In case that the heterogeneity of economic conditions is not sufficiently strong to justify geographic 
markets or where the borders of the market are not sufficiently stable or sustainable the Common 
Position suggests the definition of a national market with the imposition of – more flexible - 
geographically differentiated remedies. In these cases, typically no fully deregulated areas are 
defined. Interestingly, the full or partial deregulation of an area may according to the Common Position 
also have an economic impact in the remaining areas in case of cost-based regulation. In case of a 
segmentation of markets, it is likely that deregulation could take place in dense, low cost areas leaving 
only the higher cost areas subject to regulation, featuring a network with a higher cost base per user 
and higher regulated average prices than before the deregulation of urban areas
20
.  
 
2.2. Regulatory practices in Europe 
Since the first decisions imposing geographic segmentation of regulation (UK and Austria in 2008) a 
number of European national regulatory decisions in this field have been added (Table 1). For a more 
detailed review of WBA geographic segmentation of regulation in Europe the reader can refer to 
Houpis et al. (2011). For a review of the approach to geographic segmentation of regulation in the 
U.S. the reader can refer to Stockdale (2011). Finally, for a review of worldwide cases covering also 
countries such as Australia the reader may refer to Xavier & Ypsilanti (2011).  
 
This section will review recent decisions and summarize the current situation of geographic regulation 
in Europe across all communications markets. In particular, proposed and implemented geographic 
access regulations in European member states in the following markets will be analysed: i) wholesale 
broadband access, ii) wholesale leased lines and iii) wholesale (physical) network infrastructure 
access. Detailed references to the regulatory decisions summarized below can be found in Table 5. 
 
In a first decision proposal the Austrian NRA originally wanted to introduce geographically segmented 
markets as the first NRA in 2008 in the WBA market. The European Commission (EC) had signalled to 
veto this decision as the boundaries of this market seemed unstable. The NRA had then adapted its 
proposal to define a national WBA market and proposed to withdraw most remedies in the more 
competitive segments of the market. Lighter remedies were proposed to be imposed in MDF areas 
with two or more alternative operators present, incumbent market share below 50% and serving more 
than 2’500 households. The European Commission had accepted this proposal
21
. Regarding remedies 
it stated that ―the geographic differentiation of remedies may be appropriate in those situations where, 
for example, the boundary between areas where there are different competitive pressures is variable 
and likely to change over time, or where significant differences in competitive conditions are observed 
but the evidence may not be such as to justify the definition of sub-national markets‖. The imposition 
of geographical remedies was then, however, rejected by the Austrian Administrative Court on 12 
                                               
20
 See also BEREC Common Position 2013 
21
 ―Based on the general principle that remedies should be tailored and proportionate to the identified competition 
problem, it can be appropriate for NRAs to impose remedies which take account of locally/regionally differentiated 
competitive conditions while retaining a national geographic market definition.‖ 
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August 2008 leading to an implementation of regulation without geographical differentiation (without 
lighter remedies in more competitive areas). In the recent fourth  round of market analysis (2013) RTR 
again proposes a national market, this time with uniform remedies (retail minus price control; products 
are restricted to only business-grade products). The proposal is still pending.  
On the market for leased lines instead, the Austrian NRA proposed in 2008 a geographic 
segmentation of markets of high speed (>2 mbps) terminating segments of leased lines in two 
geographic markets: 12 competitive cities and the rest of the country. The cities would be those 
communes having i) population of more than 15’000, ii) more than three operators offering terminating 
leased line segments based on own infrastructure and iii) a market share of the incumbent <50%. The 
European Commission stated, however, that it would have doubts about the homogeneity of 
competitive conditions within these markets and that the incumbent could well not have SMP also in 
the rest of the country for high speed leased lines. In particular, more information about the 
geographical distribution of market shares and pricing structures as well as their evolution over time 
was been requested. The European Commission also reminded that a defined market should have 
stable boundaries over time. The decision has then been withdrawn implying that currently high speed 
wholesale leased lines are deregulated in 12 cities but not (yet) in the rest of the country. In its more 
recent fourth round market analysis (2013), the Austrian NRA reverted back to a national market and 
uniform remedies. The European Commission vetoed this decision as there seems to be a lack of 
evidence for homogeneous competitive conditions across all regions in the country. BEREC has 
shared this view. Especially from the 2008 analysis in the mentioned 12 cities TAs market shares are 
low between 23 and 34% in the relevant urban market, while the incumbent would not face significant 
competition in more rural markets. The European Commission has asked for an updated and a 
detailed analysis. Also the European Commission argues any reregulation should be carefully 
evaluated.  
The Czech NRA in 2012 proposed for the WBA market two geographic submarkets: districts where at 
least three infrastructures are present and the incumbent has less than 40% market share and other 
districts. Consequently, it proposed to fully deregulate the area under infrastructure competition while 
continuing to regulate the rest of the country with relatively light remedies excluding cost-orientation. 
The European Commission stated that this proposal is mainly based on the number of independent 
networks and therefore insufficient. It stated that for instance the incumbent’s wholesale offer would be 
national with national prices. Also, the homogeneity of competitive conditions would seem not to be 
given within the ―urban‖ areas as they seem to include also some small cities (with lower economies of 
scale). Moreover, the European Commission had doubts about the competitiveness of such areas. In 
particular it doubted whether Wi-Fi networks may be retail substitutes to DSL as Wi-Fi coverage would 
be limited and offer only lower speeds.  It also stated that indirect constraints on the wholesale market 
would be unlikely to be sufficient for Wi-Fi as well as for Cable. While BEREC had supported the 
NRAs proposal, it was vetoed by the EC. 
In 2009 the Dutch NRA has formally notified a national market including copper and fibre local loops 
and national remedies were set. Binding price caps for fibre, however, were in practice set per cost 
area (NL/2009/0868, NL/2013/1439). For unbundled optical distribution frame access to FTTH lines 
and ancillary services such as backhaul and collocation the NRA proposed to take as a starting point 
the concrete FTTH business case of Reggefiber, the joint-venture formed by the incumbent and an 
alternative utility operator, to roll out the NGA network (including an effective and not hypothetically 
efficient capital expenditure as in LRIC). The authority has decided to allow the joint venture to 
generate a reasonable rate of return including a risk premium. The fundamental idea is to set a first 
year access price such to make the investment viable (profitable) in a discounted cash flow (DCF) 
model estimating cash inflows (the revenues of an FTTH model over the assumed lifetime of the 
network) and cash outflows (capital expenditure and operational expenditure). Assuming that (real) 
access prices remain constant over the lifetime of the investment, the initial regulated price cap for 
access products is calculated such that the net present value of future cash flows is equal to the initial 
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capital investment, when applying an initial (reasonable) rate of return (between 7-10%, the exact 
initial amount is not disclosed). Over time the market environment may then change, e.g. demand, 
costs and competition may develop positively or negatively for the operator and the internal rate of 
return (IRR) may then varies over the years. However, such profits are not to exceed the standard risk 
cost of capital (WACC), increased by a risk premium for fibre, by more than 3.5% (representing 
regulatory risk). As long as this is not the case (verification every three years) maximum access prices 
are allowed to remain constant in real terms, i.e. to increase over time along with the consumer price 
index (1.5% per year). If instead the IRR is too high the prices are adjusted downwards by the 
authority
22
. 
The main inputs into this cost model include the expected economic lifetime (25 years), the expected 
penetration rate (60% after 2 years), capital expenditure per area, the operating costs (12-18€ per 
line per year), revenues and an initial reasonable rate of return (7-10%). In case of too pessimistic 
expectations (of demand for instance) the price would be set such (high) that too high profits could be 
generated. In the converse - too optimistic - case instead profits would ex-post be too low and 
investment incentives would be adversely affected. Using the DCF model the NRA can adjust its 
prices over time when expectations turn out to be wrong. While this is a highly flexible setting, 
targeting essentially regulatory, cost and demand uncertainty of investment over time and flexibility 
regarding the offering of different price schemes (e.g. volume discounts), it was also decided to set 
geographically different price caps for 14 areas with differing average capital expenditure 
requirements. Across these cost clusters fibre unbundling prices 2013 vary substantially from 15.52€ 
to 25.99€ per line per month in 2013 (Autoriteit Consument en Markt (2013)
23
). In addition to these 
tariffs, however, there is a national tariff scheme (18.84€ per line per month), which is calculated as 
the weighted average of all areas. Wholesale customers can choose between the national tariff 
scheme or the local tariff scheme, but the choice cannot vary from area to area. However, in the 
longer term this may imply that firms are active either in urban areas where they choose the local tariff 
(as it is lower than the national tariff) or in rural areas, where they choose the national tariff (as it is 
lower than the local tariff). Interestingly in the long term the binding prices in rural areas could then be 
lower than the price necessary to cover all area costs as calculated by the business case. In line with 
what will be show in the next chapter cost recovery prices are reasonably reduced in urban areas, 
while, however, not increasing them in rural areas.  
It should be noted here that the DCF results could also be largely achieved with traditional LRIC 
pricing as long as identical information is used
24
. Both approaches consider initial capital expenditure, 
forecast demand developments and use a WACC to calculate the revenues/prices for the first year. 
The European Commission has in any case accepted the Dutch regulation proposal. To date the 
Dutch NRA is the only NRA applying geographically differentiated regulated prices according to cost 
clusters. Interestingly up to now the incumbent had consistently priced about 2.50€ below the price 
cap, which seems to indicate the presence of relevant infrastructure competition with cable and 
regulated copper products (Middleton and Van Gorp (2010)). Next to the European Commission 
notifications the reader may refer to Middleton and Van Gorp (2010) for a review of the Dutch case.  
 
The Finnish NRA is facing a particular market with a large number of regional incumbents. Initially, 
geographic markets were defined along traditional operating areas, where 27 regional  incumbents 
have a market share of more than 90% in their wholesale physical network infrastructure access 
markets. After the NRA had identified that the regional incumbents started to invest in fibre networks 
outside of their traditional operating areas, a more refined concept of regional markets was defined. 
The NRA has started by analysing the competitive conditions in 336 municipalities. It has then 
aggregated these municipalities based on the following criteria: i) the municipalities compose a 
physically contiguous geographic market area; ii) in terms of the number of local loops, the market 
share of the area’s market leader in the municipalities belonging to one area is more or less equal 
                                               
22
 The approach is broadly described in OPTA (2008) 
23
 See Bijlage B 
24
 See Neu, Neumann and Vogelsang (2012), p. 69 
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(variation of ± 10%); and iii)  the number of competing telecommunications operators owning their own 
local loops in municipalities belonging to the area is more or less equal (± 1 telecommunications 
operator). The result was the definition of 111 sub-national markets for both the WBA market and the 
wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access market. In 2012 the NRA in a corresponding full 
market analysis found seven of these WBA markets to be effectively competitive and full deregulation 
in these areas was proposed (including Helsinki). In the remaining 104 areas light regulation excluding 
cost-orientation for WBA of the regional 27 incumbents is proposed. The European Commission did 
not comment on these issues and the decision has been adopted. 
In the market for wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access instead the Finnish NRA has 
defined 111 sub-national markets as in the analysis of the WBA market. None of these markets was, 
however, deemed to be sufficiently competitive and regional incumbents (at least larger ones) are 
subject to cost-based regulation. The European Commission did not comment on these issues and the 
decision has been adopted.  
The German NRA in 2010 has analysed the WBA market and had identified 771 MDF areas (covering 
about a quarter of all households) where i) the incumbent has less than <50% retail market share, ii) 
there are at least four operators offering DSL and iii) the MDF has more than 4’000 subscribers (i.e. 
sufficiently large to allow unbundling to efficient entrants). However, while the UK and Portugal had 
proceeded with full deregulation in similar areas the German NRA did not follow this approach and 
propose a national market. The reasons include that the incumbent pursued a national pricing and 
product strategy. While the NRA did not propose a geographically segmented remedies it proposed 
uniform light set of remedies at national scale, i.e. excluding cost-orientation. The European 
Commission agreed that there is no conclusive evidence for a geographically differentiated regulation. 
The decision has been adopted.  
The Italian NRA has analysed the competitive conditions in the WBA access market in 2011 and 
concluded that these are not sufficiently heterogeneous to warrant the definition of sub-national 
markets. The NRA has, however, proposed to differentiate remedies between areas with infrastructure 
competition and areas without (details to be defined in a later decision). The Commission advised the 
NRA to follow the criteria for NGA remedies in the NGA recommendation. It reminded the NRA that for 
a definition of geographic markets the number of operators in a given exchange area, the size of the 
area to ensure possible entry at the given scale, the distribution of market shares and geographic 
pricing would need to be analysed. A separate proceeding on geographically differentiated remedies 
will be opened. With regards to remedies the NRA plans to impose a lighter form of price control in 
more competitive areas leading to higher prices.  
The Polish NRA in 2012 has proposed a national WBA market with a lighter set of regulatory 
remedies for the four largest cities (where there is retail competition from cable and other operators) 
and one for the rest of the country. In the first segment of the market, mostly urban areas, the NRA 
proposed to remove the remedies of cost-orientation, accounting separation and transparency, leaving 
only access and non-discrimination obligations. The European Commission has recommended that 
the NRA withdraw the proposal and strengthen its analysis of competitive conditions. While the 
European Commission has no veto on remedies, the NRA has withdrawn its decision proposal.  
Also in the WBA market but in an earlier round of analysis of the WBA market of the Polish NRA than 
the one cited above geographically segmented markets with a fully deregulated area of 11 cities under 
competition. The European Commission had, however, vetoed this proposal as differentiated prices 
and market shares as well as indirect constraints and potential competition would not have been 
sufficiently demonstrated and market data had been judged to be outdated. 
The Portuguese NRA suggested in 2010 a WBA geographic market definition with competitive MDF 
areas where there is at least one ULL based alternative operator and a cable operator (taken into 
consideration when the percentage of connected cable households is at least 60% in the area) and 
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non-competitive MDF areas on the other side. The competitive area was proposed to be fully 
deregulated. The non-competitive areas would still feature a form of light price regulation (retail-minus 
approach). The European Commission had raised concerns that in some competitive MDF areas the 
market share of the incumbent is still above 50%. It has therefore invited the NRA to carefully monitor 
the evolution of competitive conditions in the future, but the decision was not vetoed and has been 
adopted.    
In the leased line market, instead, the Portuguese NRA proposed in 2010 a geographic segmentation 
of the trunk segments of leased lines market (which usually connect the exchanges of the country) in a 
competitive trunk market connecting 110 local exchanges where at least two alternative operators are 
present with own infrastructure and one ―non competitive‖ trunk market connecting the rest of the 
exchanges. It was then proposed to fully deregulate the competitive leased lines routes (as done by 
the Swiss NRA) and to impose regulation including cost orientation on the remaining lines. Given that 
the terminating segments are regulated similarly, the regulatory outcome would be similar to the one in 
Switzerland. The European Commission has stated that the geographical market segmentation is 
primarily based on the number of operators, which it considers to be insufficient, and that further 
evidence is necessary, such as markets shares over time and regionally differentiated wholesale and 
retail pricing. Given the important differences in market shares and network duplication the 
Commission did however not contest the decision and it was adopted. It invited the NRA, however, to 
base its next market analysis on more detailed data.  
The Spanish NRA had identified in 2008 differing competitive conditions in the WBA market but these 
were not deemed sufficient for a definition of regional markets. It argued that the incumbent’s retail 
pricing was still national. It was also argued that the current NGA roll-out would affect the boundaries 
of possible geographic markets meaning that sub-national market boundaries would be unstable. 
However, unlike the German NRA, the Spanish NRA proposed geographically differentiated remedies. 
In areas where the incumbent faces infrastructure-based competition (at least Cable and at least two 
LLU-based competitors) and where the incumbent’s market share is below 50%, the NRA proposed 
the withdrawal of the cost-orientation obligation. The Commission has asked the Spanish NRA to 
detail its geographic analysis further by analyzing different geographic commercial strategies, average 
retail prices, functionalities provided and market shares (retail and wholesale) in both areas. Also the 
Spanish NRA was suggested to analyse in detail the stability of boundaries and a possible trend to 
competition in the urban areas. BEREC supported the Spanish NRAs view of a national market, in 
particular because of the unstable character of geographic borders and the fact that different retail 
prices could reflect different technologies rather than market pressure
25
. It also agreed that 
competitive differences could warrant geographic differentiation of remedies. Finally, however, the 
Spanish NRA has withdrawn the proposal imposing remedies formerly proposed only in more rural 
regions also on national scale. No further round of market analysis has yet been notified.  
In the leased line market the Swiss NRA in 2010 had defined the market for trunk segments of leased 
lines as the market of lines between Communes where two or more alternative operators to the 
incumbent are present with own infrastructure (e.g. 25 Communes in 2009 and 41 Communes in 
2010). The trunk market defined in this way has in a second step been deemed to be competitive and 
fully deregulated. Not being part of the EU framework, the Swiss NRA did not need to notify the EC. If 
it would have had to, in light of the Portuguese case, the decision might have been vetoed for unstable 
market borders. It should be noted, however, that geographic segmentation of markets is the only 
legal tool for geographic segmentation of regulation available to the Swiss regulator as the Swiss 
framework foresees no flexibility of remedies. Imposing geographically differentiated remedies is 
therefore currently not a viable option for the regulator.    
The UK NRA has been the pioneering NRA regarding geographic segmentation of markets in Europe. 
Its current WBA access regulation foresees three markets: 1) MDF areas where BT is the only 
                                               
25
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operator present, 2) MDF areas where in addition two or more alternative operators with own 
infrastructure or over LLU are present
26
 (or three when BTs market share is greater than 50%) and 3) 
areas where in addition four or more alternative operators are present (or three when BTs market 
share is lower than 50%). While market 3 is fully deregulated as it ensures competition, in market 1 full 
regulation including cost orientation and price-control (RPI-X) is imposed. Finally, in market 2 the 
additional price control remedy is withdrawn. Combining full deregulation with a segmentation of 
remedies between different markets, this proposal corresponds to date to the most flexible regulatory 
approach adopted in the EU. The European Commission reminded the NRA, however, that the sole 
criterion of the number of operators is not sufficient for geographic market segmentation, but that 
homogeneity has to be ensured checking for possible geographic variations in market shares and 
pricing. It invited the NRA in particular to provide additional structural and behavioural evidence, such 
as data on barriers to entry, marketing and sales strategies and service characteristics, which could 
further sustain the geographic market delineation. The European Commission did, however, not veto 
this decision and it was subsequently adopted.  
Moreover, in the leased line market, the UK NRA in a detailed analysis in 2013 has defined 
geographic markets for high performance traditional interface terminating segments of leased lines 
(>8mpbs). Effective competition has mainly been found in the Western, Eastern and Central London 
area (WECLA). The WECLA has been slightly extended in the recent market analysis and follows 421 
post code areas where competition is assumed, i.e. two or more competitors with own infrastructure 
and relatively low market shares of the incumbent. In practice the NRA estimates the number of 
potential competitors in a postal sector with a flexibility point within 200m of business sites. It is 
supposed that 200m can be reasonably bridged by any new installation of fibre to provide high 
performance leased lines services to a client. Then, the average number of potential operators per 
business site in the postcode sector was calculated and contingent postal codes with at least two 
alternative operators were grouped together. Market shares of the incumbent in this area were shown 
to be considerably lower and some geographic differences in prices have been detected. The only 
area with significant differences in economic conditions when compared to the rest of the country was 
given was then shown to be the WECLA. Finally, very high speed leased lines (622 Mbps) were 
defined separately (as a joint national market) as both submarkets seemed to be equally competitive. 
Regarding regulation, the NRA proposed to fully deregulate competitive markets (this is automatic) 
and to impose price control on the remaining markets. The European Commission has cleared this 
proposal and it was subsequently adopted.  
It should further be notes that in some countries the low performance copper-based WBA market has 
been fully deregulated at national level (Malta, Romania). In  Malta, in the retail market, two equally 
large competitors were found (incumbent and cable) and joint dominance could not be demonstrated 
in 2008. The assessment could possibly be different in light of NGA services and deployment today. In 
Romania, strong infrastructure competition seems to take place on a national level with the incumbent 
having relatively low market shares when compared to cable competitors. Also, competitive conditions 
were not judged sufficiently heterogeneous to warrant sub-national markets. The European 
Commission has accepted full national deregulation in 2010, but cautions the NRA to follow market 
development especially of competitive conditions across areas closely.  
 
To sum up, even though the European Commission works towards a homogenous approach to 
regulation across Europe, current regulatory policy on geographic segmentation of regulation is highly 
fragmented. Various different approaches and criteria still co-exist. This may also be a result of the 
current absence of a veto of the European Commission on remedies.  
As the review of relevant regulatory cases shows, in several cases a geographic segmentation of 
markets has not implied full deregulation. On the other hand depending on the concrete details of 
regulation a remedy set can also nearly correspond to no regulation. The Austrian NRA in its WBA 
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decision, for instance, had imposed only accounting separation in competitive areas
27
. Therefore, both 
the segmentation of markets as well as the segmentation of remedies may in practice imply near 
equivalent market regulation. The amount of fine-tuning then also depends on the preference of the 
regulator and the instruments it is ready to impose. The simplest form of fine-tuning would be cost-
orientation and full deregulation. But different regulators have proposed different solutions than that 
including access-only obligations preventing foreclosure
28
.  
To conclude this overview, the approach of lighter regulation where competition is more intense is in 
line with theory when looking at static welfare – as increasing competition decreases the necessity of 
safeguarding competition. What is scarcely discussed are the detailed effects on investment 
incentives and the implementation of the remedies. For instance, LLU prices are usually based on 
uniform ―cost-oriented‖ LRIC prices. As costs in many cases significantly differ across areas
29
, uniform 
prices in regional markets may not set the correct investment incentives in all areas as will be seen in 
the next sections. Of the reviewed cases there is one exception to this: The Dutch regulator has – 
under formally national regulation - imposed geographically segmented prices according to local 
capital expenditure requirements. 
 
  
                                               
27
 This decision was only rejected by a national court. 
28
 Generally, it can be noted that remedies in service-based markets could also be lighter as entry barriers are 
lower than for instance in the market for wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access. 
29
 Ilic et al. (2009) show that in Switzerland costs can differ by a factor 6 across geographic cost clusters.  
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Table 1 - Regulatory practice – recent cases of sub-national geographic markets and geographically segmented remedies in Europe (August 2013) 
Country 
EC 
Case 
No.  
SMP  
operator(s) 
Product 
market 
Geographic market 
Geographic 
Segmentation 
of Remedies 
Type of regulation  imposed Status Comment on status 
 
Geographic Segmentation of markets 
 
Austria AT/2013
/1442-
1443 
AT/2009
/0932 
 
Telekom 
Austria 
Terminating 
segments of 
leased lines 
> 2 Mbps 
and < 155 
Mbps 
1) 12 competitive  
communes having 
population >15’000,  more 
than three infrastructure 
based competitors and a 
market share of the 
incumbent <50% 
2) The rest of the country  
- 1) None  
2) Access, non-discrimination, 
price control,  accounting 
separation and transparency 
 
Withdrawn 
(partially) 
A first market definition of 12 cities and the rest of the country 
has been contested by the EC. The partial decision of 
regulating high speed lines in the rest of the country had been 
withdrawn. 
In its more recent fourth round market analysis (2013), the 
Austrian NRA reverted back to no geographic markets and 
uniform remedies. The EC vetoed this decision as there seems 
to be a lack of evidence for homogeneous competitive 
conditions across all regions in the country. BEREC has 
shared this view. A new final decision is still pending.  
Czech 
Republic 
CZ/2012
/1322 
Telefonica 
CR 
(incumbent) 
Wholesale 
broadband 
access 
1) Districts with at least 
three infrastructures 
2) Rest of the country 
- 1) None 
2) Access, non-discrimination, 
cost-orientation, accounting 
separation and transparency 
Withdrawn BEREC supported largely the NRAs proposal. However, the 
proposal was vetoed by the Commission and it has not 
entered into force. 
Finland FI/2013/
1328-
1329  
27 regional 
incumbents 
Wholesale 
broadband 
access  
111 regional submarkets 
aggregating contingent  
municipalities with similar 
competitive conditions 
(number of competitors 
and market share of 
incumbent), 104 of which 
are non competitive and 7 
competitive 
- 7/111 markets: None 
104/111 markets: Access, 
non-discrimination, and 
transparency 
Adopted The EC did not comment on geographic issues and the 
decision has been adopted. 
 
Finland FI/2013/
1328-
1329  
27 regional 
incumbents 
Wholesale 
(physical) 
network 
infrastructur
e access  
111 regional submarkets 
aggregating contingent  
municipalities with similar 
competitive conditions 
(number of competitors 
and market share of 
incumbent) all of which are 
non competitive 
- 111 markets: Access, non-
discrimination, cost-
orientation, accounting 
separation and transparency 
(small regional incumbents are 
subject to lighter regulation) 
Adopted 
 
The EC did not comment on geographic issues and the 
decision has been adopted. 
Portugal PT/2008
/0850-
851 
PT Wholesale 
broadband 
access 
1) MDF areas where 
Cable (at least 60% 
coverage) and one LLU 
operators are present  
2) Other MDF areas 
- 1) None 
2) Access, non-discrimination, 
price control (retail minus), 
accounting separation and 
transparency 
Adopted The EC had raised concerns that in some competitive MDF 
areas the market share of the incumbent is still above 50%. It 
has therefore invited the NRA to carefully monitor the future 
evolution of competitive conditions, but the decision was 
adopted.   
 
Portugal PT/2010
/1121 
PT Leased lines 
(trunk)  
1) Competitive trunk 
segments (between 110 
local exchanges where 
- 1) None 
2) Access, non-discrimination, 
cost orientation, accounting 
Adopted The EC has states that the geographical segmentation is 
primarily based on the number of operators and was 
insufficient. Given the important differences in market shares 
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two or more alternative 
operators are present) 
2) Other, non competitive 
trunk  segments  
separation and transparency and network duplication the Commission did, however, not 
contest the decision. 
Switzer-
land 
- Swisscom Leased lines 
(―trunk‖ 
segments, 
where trunk 
corresponds 
here to the a 
competitive 
backbone 
segment of 
the leased 
line market)  
1) Lines between 
communes where more 
than 3 operators are 
present (25 Communes in 
2009 and 41 Communes 
in 2010) 
2) Other leased lines 
(―terminating‖ segments) 
- 1) No regulation 
2) Access, non-discrimination, 
cost-orientation and 
transparency 
Adopted This decision is in force. Not being part of the EU framework, 
the Swiss NRA did not need to notify the EC. If it would have 
had to, in light of the other cases, the decision would probably 
have been vetoed for unstable market borders.  
UK UK/2010
/1123 
UK/2007
/0733  
BT Wholesale 
broadband 
access 
1) MDF areas where the 
incumbent is the only 
operator present ,  
2) MDF areas where two 
or more alternative 
operators are present (or 
three when BTs market 
share is greater than 50%) 
and  
3) Areas where in addition 
four or more alternative 
operators are present (or 
three when BTs market 
share is lower than 50% 
- 1) Access, non-discrimination, 
cost orientation, accounting 
separation and transparency 
as well as an additional strict 
form of price control (RPI-X).  
2) Access, non-discrimination, 
cost orientation,  cost 
orientation, accounting 
separation and transparency 
3) None 
Adopted The EC reminded the NRA that the sole criterion of the 
number of operators is not sufficient for geographic market 
segmentation, but that homogeneity has to be ensured 
checking for possible geographic variations in market shares 
and pricing. The EC invited the NRA in particular to provide 
additional structural and behavioural evidence. It did, however, 
not veto this decision.  
 
UK UK/2013
/1428 
UK/2008
/0747-
0749 
BT Terminating 
segments of 
leased lines 
8> Mbps 
with tradition 
interface 
leased lines 
1) WECLA: Areas with two 
or more alternative 
competitors with own 
infrastructure and low 
market shares of the 
incumbent 
2) Rest of the country 
- 1) None 
2) Access, non-discrimination, 
price control (RPI+X), 
accounting separation and 
transparency (for bandwidth at 
622 Mbps no remedies are 
imposed) 
Adopted The EC has cleared this proposal and it was subsequently 
adopted.  
 
 
Geographic Segmentation of remedies 
 
Austria AT/2013
/1475 
AT/2007
/0757 
 
Telekom 
Austria 
Wholesale 
broadband 
access 
1) MDF areas with two or 
more alternative operators 
present, incumbent market 
share below 50% and 
serving more than 2’500 
households 
2) other areas 
- 1) Accounting separation  
2) Access, non-discrimination, 
price control (retail minus),  
accounting separation and 
transparency 
 
Adopted 
but 
rejected 
by national 
court 
The EC had signalled to veto a first proposal of the NRA to 
introduce geographic markets in 2008. The NRA had then 
adapted its proposal to define a national wholesale broadband 
access market and proposed to withdraw most remedies in 
more competitive segments of the market. The EC had 
accepted this proposal. It was, however, rejected by the 
Austrian Administrative Court 2008 leading to an 
implementation of regulation without geographical 
differentiation. In the recent fourth round of market analysis 
(2013) the NRA again proposes a national market, this time 
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with nationally uniform light remedies (retail minus price 
control). But no geographical differentiation of remedies is 
proposed. A new final decision is still pending.  
Germany DE/2010
/1116 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
Wholesale 
broadband 
access  
National - Access, non-discrimination, 
accounting separation and 
transparency 
Adopted While the NRA had analysed a possible submarket, national 
pricing strategies of the incumbent indicated a national market. 
The Commission agreed that there is no conclusive evidence 
for a geographically differentiated regulation. The decision was 
then adopted.  
Italy IT/2011/
1230 
Telecom 
Italia 
Wholesale 
broadband 
access 
National 1) Infrastructure 
competition 
2) No 
infrastructure 
competition 
(the definition of 
areas under 
infrastructure 
competition is 
still pending) 
1) Access, non-discrimination, 
cost-orientation (however a 
particular methodology leading 
to higher prices), accounting 
separation and transparency 
2) access, non-discrimination, 
cost-orientation, accounting 
separation and transparency 
Adopted 
(partially) 
The market has been defined nationally. A concrete proposal 
on the geographical extent of the segmentation of remedies is 
still pending.  
Netherlan
ds 
 
NL/2009
/0868 
KPN/Regge
fiber 
Wholesale 
(physical) 
network 
infrastructur
e access 
National National, but 
fibre LLU access 
prices are 
geographically 
segmented 
according to 
capital 
requirements 
(14 areas in 
2013).  
Access, non-discrimination, 
transparency and price 
control. For fibre: Max. Internal 
rate of return (IRR) allowed up 
to risk adjusted WACC + risk 
premium 3.5%. If exceeded 
price caps are reduced.  
Local fibre LLU access price 
caps currently range from 16-
26€/month. There is also a 
cap for a national tariff of 18€  
Adopted The EC has accepted the Dutch regulation proposal.  
Poland PL/2011
/1184 
TPSA Wholesale 
broadband 
access  
National (earlier proposal : 
11 cities, rest of the 
country) 
1) Four largest 
cities 
2) Rest of the 
country 
1) Access and non-
discrimination 
2) Access, non-discrimination, 
cost-orientation, accounting 
separation and transparency 
(earlier proposal  in 2011: no 
regulation in 11 cities, cost 
regulation in the rest of the 
country) 
Withdrawn Both decisions have been withdrawn, meaning that currently 
national cost-based regulation is still in place.  
 
Spain ES/2008
/0805 
Telefonica Wholesale 
broadband 
access  
National 1) MDF areas 
where Cable 
and two LLU 
operators are 
present and the 
incumbent has 
less than 50% 
market share  
2) Other MDF 
areas 
1) Access and non-
discrimination 
2) Access, non-discrimination, 
cost-orientation, accounting 
separation and transparency 
 
Withdrawn While BEREC had supported the NRAs view on both a 
national market and the possibility of geographic remedies in 
this case, the EC had asked the Spanish NRA to withdraw the 
proposal for insufficient evidence.  
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2.3. Review of Literature 
As described above the subject of geographic segmentation of regulation is receiving increasing 
attention of regulators as the mass market roll-out of new access infrastructures by the incumbent, but 
also new entrants at local scale, are increasingly requested by the public and taking place. A popular 
example described in regulatory practice section is the UK WBA market, where the regulator has first 
introduced geographic differentiation of regulation by essentially adopting full deregulation in areas 
where four or more alternative infrastructures are present and imposing differentiated regulatory 
remedies in areas where only the incumbent is present and in areas where two or more alternative 
infrastructures are present.  
 
Some academic articles analyse the geographical impact of geographically uniform access prices 
(Lestage & Flacher (2010) or Flacher & Jennequin (2012)). To date, however, a comprehensive 
theoretical analysis of geographically segmented access regulation has been undertaken only by 
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b)
30
. In addition, De Matos & Ferreira (2011) analyse similar 
effects. In this section this literature will be summarized. An overview is presented in Table 8. The 
detailed effects of the different regulatory options according to the literature are described in the next 
section.  
 
In Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b), in a Greenfield setting two potential vertically integrated 
incumbent firms locally roll out own equivalent infrastructure with increasing fixed costs in more rural 
areas and with identical cost functions. Both operators can choose in which areas they will deploy own 
infrastructure and decide on the level of their investments, but they are supposed to start roll-out in 
densest areas first and roll out subsequently in ever less dense areas. While one operator can roll out 
in more areas than the other the possibility that operators deploy alone in different areas is not given. 
In a static game in a first stage a regulator is setting the regulated wholesale access charges in all 
areas. In a second stage the two firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively set their investment 
levels. Then, a possible downstream entrant (and an incumbent in areas where only the other 
incumbent is present) decide whether to enter or not considering the access charge. The entrant 
chooses randomly an operator for access in case two incumbents are present. Finally, in a fourth 
stage all retail operators compete with horizontally differentiated broadband products for final 
broadband customers by setting possibly also geographically differentiated retail prices. The model 
uses quasi-linear preferences following Shubik and Levitan (1980) and an exponential investment cost 
function for the market model. Using this framework the effects of a variety of possible geographic 
regulation instruments are analysed. In particular the authors describe the effects of geographically 
differentiated access price regulation in areas with different cost levels and/or competitive conditions 
and geographically differentiated remedies.  
 
Similarly, in the absence of legacy networks and assuming a fibre Greenfield market, in an 
endogenous entry setting, De Matos & Ferreira (2011) perform a market simulation with Cournot 
differentiated goods retail competition. It is assumed that two areas exist, one with low deployment 
cost and one with high deployment cost such to contemporarily exclude the possibility of infrastructure 
competition. In the first stage integrated and downstream operators decide in which markets to enter 
and in the second stage they compete on the retail market for end customers. The paper simulates the 
resulting geographic market structure and welfare.  
 
While there are to date no other articles taking geographic regulation explicitly into account, some look 
at the converse problem: the impact of uniform regulation on geographic coverage considering 
geographic differences in cost levels.  Lestage & Flacher (2010) in a similar static stage game as 
Bourreau, Cambini, et al. (2012b) assume Bertrand retail competition with vertically differentiated 
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 Pereira & Ferreira (2011) also consider geographic access prices. As the detailed functions of their algorithm is, 
however, not disclosed it is difficult to compare their model.   
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goods. In most of the paper the source of quality is assumed to be generated by the service provided 
on the infrastructure, i.e. duplication of access infrastructure is not socially valuable
31
. They then 
analyse the impact of uniform access price regulation on the geographic market structure and welfare.  
 
In a setting with legacy technology and geographically uniform prices Flacher & Jennequin (2012) 
show that maximum coverage is reached without regulation but that this is not optimal. With one 
potential vertically integrated fibre incumbent and a potential downstream entrant as well as Cournot 
retail competition with vertically and horizontally differentiated goods it is shown that the social 
optimum is achieved in case the regulator sets not only access prices but also a coverage 
requirement
32
.  
 
Regarding the effects of regulation, the details of the imposed regulatory instruments matter. In 
European regulatory practice the debate on options to geographically fully deregulate or impose lighter 
sets of remedies is intense as the review of regulatory cases shows. On the other hand in academic 
research the analysis of welfare effects of geographically segmented regulated access prices or the 
problems implied by uniform pricing have not yet received much attention. In the next section the 
detailed findings of the existing papers with respect to the different regulatory options will be reviewed 
and put into perspective. The literature is summarized in Table 8 in the annex. 
 
2.4. Review of regulatory options and effects 
The different regulatory options to approach geographical access regulation identified by the literature 
include geographically uniform access regulation as well as competition and/or cost-based 
geographical segmentation of remedies and prices. Uniform access regulation is a regulation which 
does not foresee any geographic segmentation. Such a regulation may include any of the regulatory 
access remedies (access, non-discrimination, transparency, cost-orientation, price control) or none 
(full deregulation). In case price control is imposed, prices under uniform access regulation do not vary 
across areas. On the other hand geographical segmentation of regulation is a type of regulation where 
the detailed regulatory instruments may imply geographically different regulatory conditions. This 
includes the imposition of different regulatory access remedies in different areas, the imposition of 
access prices which vary geographically based on the level of competition and/or the required 
investment cost in a given area and full deregulation of some areas. The detailed effects of different 
geographic regulatory policy options in light of the literature under consideration are analysed in this 
section.  
 
1) Uniform access regulation 
Uniform access regulation describes settings where there is no geographic segmentation of regulation 
of any kind. Nevertheless, uniform regulation can have geographic effects on the market. Uniform 
regulation analysed in the reviewed literature include: full deregulation (free market), cost-based 
access prices and (any other) uniform access price regulation (e.g. maximising static and dynamic 
welfare). A particular form of uniform conditions in the access market is given by the case where no 
access products are available. 
i) Uniform access pricing 
Under uniform above-cost access pricing an access charge above marginal cost is set at the same 
level in all areas, independently of the level of competition or investment cost in these areas. This is a 
common case as current regulatory practice in Europe implies that remedies do not necessarily need 
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 The authors provide, however, an alternative specification where the source of quality is supposed to be driven 
by the underlying infrastructure. In this case firm B accessing a high quality infrastructure A is able to replicate its 
high quality services. With a possible own lower quality infrastructure this is not possible. 
32
 Technically this would correspond to a beauty contest including minimum coverage requirements.  
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to be differentiated geographically even if competitive differences are present. It should be noted that 
long run incremental cost (LRIC) price regulation is also considered to be an above cost access price 
regulation as it applies a positive rent. Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) show that setting a 
high uniform access charge means that investment incentives increase both the extent of single 
infrastructure areas (SIAs) and of duplicate infrastructure areas (DIAs). The typical trade-off between 
maximising per area welfare of connected areas applying low access prices and increasing coverage 
to generate additional area welfare in marginal areas applying high access prices arises. It should be 
noted that this analysis assumes Greenfield investments and therefore the absence of a legacy 
network. This allows to abstract from migration effects which would in the context of this model likely 
lead to an excessive level of complexity.  
Independently of how investment cost is specified the authors show with their market model that the 
social benefits from investing in duplication in a marginal area in case of uniform prices are negative. A 
regulator would therefore in this setting wish to decrease the investment incentives for duplication and 
therefore the extent of the DIAs with respect to the extent of SIAs, the reason being essentially the 
duplication of fixed costs in case of duopoly
33
. This can only be done by decreasing the prices in DIA 
areas relatively to SIA areas. Any uniform pricing (including cost-based pricing described below) is 
therefore never optimal and higher welfare can be achieved with geographically segmented regulation 
according to competition.   
Lestage & Flacher (2010) show in a substantially similar game-theoretic setting as Bourreau, Cambini 
and Hoernig (2012b) that, when investment costs increase towards rural areas and two potential fibre 
incumbents - having an outside option with ―traditional‖ low-quality technology - decide on 
investments, imposing (uniform) regulated access prices limits the area of total coverage and retail 
prices is reduced when compared to the free market. On the other hand, high differentiation of retail 
services can increase coverage. In addition, the authors show that access regulation limits the areas 
where both operators roll out as in Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b). Subsequently it is shown 
that there are areas between DIAs and where no operator rolls out, where one operator rolls out in 
equilibrium (SIAs); but that for a subset of these areas there are two equilibria
34
, where it is not clear 
which operator would invest and it is then uncertain whether there will be investment at all or not. This 
zone of uncertainty would only disappear in case the quality advantage between the firms is small. In 
addition, this zone is supposed to be moving towards more dense areas when the access price falls.  
Also, Avenali et al (2010), while not directly modelling geographic effects, expect that geographically 
de-averaged access prices (above-cost in urban areas and at cost in rural areas) would raise welfare 
as this would induce more efficient investment in high density areas and low-density areas.  
Cost-based access regulation is a particular case of uniform pricing as it would imply the uniform 
setting of prices at (nationally averaged) marginal costs. Fixed investment costs in the industry are 
typically very high (and varying across regions) and marginal costs are typically very low and do not 
differ substantially across regions. It can therefore be expected that a geographically differentiated 
cost-based access pricing (access prices per area set at marginal cost per area) would be equivalent 
to a uniform implementation. In Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b), uniform cost-based access 
charges would reduce total coverage with respect to an unregulated setting. The trade-off between 
static and dynamic welfare does not arise here as SIA and DIA prices are set at the same level, 
implying that no additional profits can possibly be generated by an operator by investing in duplication. 
The duplicated infrastructure would have to be resold at marginal cost at wholesale level generating 
no additional potential wholesale profits while the potentially investing operator would already have 
access to the infrastructure at minimal possible cost from its rival to generate the same retail profits as 
without investment. Such regulation would be optimal only in cases where duplication is not feasible 
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 In case of high access charges and a high level of service differentiation further incentives for duplication would 
be necessary.  
34
 Such areas are only present when the exogenous quality advantage of firm A over B is insufficient 
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(i.e. investment cost in a marginal area is very high). When duplication is feasible instead and cost-
based regulation prevents it from taking place, this would correspond to a loss of welfare. Uniform 
cost-based access regulation is therefore not optimal.  While duplication is not possible in this setting, 
it is instead with uniform prices above-costs as this starts to create wholesale profits for a duplicate 
infrastructure and lower opportunity costs for the second incumbent to invest. For this reason welfare 
would tend to be lower with cost-based uniform access prices than with uniform above-cost prices.  
Lestage & Flacher (2010) similarly show that uniform cost-based pricing is not optimal as it is not 
taking into account the correct investment incentives and is reducing total and duplicate coverage 
even more than under uniform above cost access pricing. They also show that, when tastes are 
sufficiently heterogeneous, an optimal regulated access charge would depend on: the lowest 
investment cost across areas (or in other words the maximum population density), the lowest and 
highest quality valuations of consumers and quality (where the quality of the traditional copper network 
is assumed to be zero and the quality of new infrastructures strictly positive). Moreover, it is shown 
that the optimal access charge increases in the lowest investment cost across areas (and decreases 
in the highest population density).  
ii) Other forms of uniform regulation 
There exist also other forms of uniform regulation, namely full deregulation and the case where 
wholesale access is not available (for example for technical reasons). In the case when access is not 
available the firms can make retail offers only where they have their own infrastructure. Firms then roll 
out both up to a point where per area duopoly profits become lower than the per area investment cost. 
Then one of the firms may roll out up to a point where per area monopoly profits become lower than 
the per area investment cost. While firms are symmetric ex-ante this leads still to differences ex-post, 
as in some regions only monopoly profits can ensure coverage and hence only one provider is 
present. Also, the case of full deregulation (when access is available) is a type of geographically 
uniform regulation. However, differently to the above cases it may imply geographically segmented 
commercial wholesale access prices. The market model of  Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) 
shows that when services are sufficiently differentiated, downstream entry is beneficial to the industry 
due to a demand expansion effect (even though the retail profits of incumbents decline when giving 
access). In particular they show that in this case foreclosure (prices set to exclude the entrant) can 
never happen in SIA areas as giving access can increase overall industry profits with differentiated 
goods and the incumbent is able to extract such profit. In DIA areas, instead, foreclosure is possible 
only when there is low differentiation at the retail level. In such case the regulator could impose an 
access-only obligation preventing foreclosure, which might be welfare enhancing as will be also shown 
below. Finally, a regulator would only set regulated prices below the potential commercial wholesale 
prices. 
Lestage & Flacher (2010) show with their model in a free, fully deregulated market, when considering 
two firms A and B, of which A always provides the higher quality service
35
, that where firm A has rolled 
out infrastructure as a monopoly, it will not provide wholesale access to B, while a monopolist B would 
set a wholesale price such as to allow the provision of (higher quality) services by A. This, as 
excluding product A from the market would reduce the total profits possibly extracted from the market. 
Regulatory intervention is therefore necessary in monopoly areas to avoid foreclosure in SIA areas.   
A different case is given when considering that the quality is driven by the infrastructure instead of 
services. Then, there is no more reason for foreclosure, as B can also provide high quality services 
when accessing infrastructure A. In this case, however, duplication is not desirable as infrastructure 
investment by B would only lead to a provision of the market with lower quality goods.  
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 Both quality A and B are considered to be preferred to a ―traditional‖ outside quality which is provided in case of 
no investment.  
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From a practical point of view it might be interesting to consider company statements during the 
consultation of the BEREC Common Position on Geographic Aspects of Market analysis in 2008. 
Some local alternative infrastructure providers seemed to have a critical view on geographic 
deregulation leading to de-averaging of wholesale prices
36
. In the current situation the incumbent 
needs to charge a uniform wholesale access price (at a national price cap) and cannot offer lower 
prices as this would imply charging lower prices in rural areas as well. The price is in urban area 
therefore in practice also a price floor. These regulated prices could potentially be very high when 
compared to local urban DIA investment costs and deregulation in presence of any form of competition 
may potentially lower them decreasing the value of all infrastructures in the market especially of 
alternative investors
37
.  
 
2) Geographical segmentation of regulation 
 
Geographical segmentation of regulation describes general settings where regulated conditions vary 
across areas. Regulatory instruments that can be segmented include regulated access prices 
according to competitive conditions and/or investment cost, as well as geographic segmentation of 
remedies in general - as for instance cost-based regulation in rural areas and ―lighter‖ forms of 
regulation such as access-only obligations in urban areas.   
i) Geographical segmentation of access prices according to competitive conditions 
and investment costs 
 
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) describe pure geographical segmentation as optimal 
regulated access charges which are set in areas of different population density and therefore 
investment costs separately and which are differing in addition according to the competitive conditions 
in the area (SIA or DIA). No European NRA has to date chosen such a highly differentiated model with 
varying regulated access prices also according to the level of investment cost and there is currently no 
significant public debate. Also, No European NRA has to date implemented such a SIA/DIA distinction 
purely (rule of thumb) as it is assumed that the number of operators is not the only driver of 
competition. Furthermore, no NRA has proposed differing directly regulated access prices based on a 
single methodology according to competition. As has been shown the Dutch NRA offers, however, 
regionally segmented regulated NGA access prices. 
While the authors indicate that such a type of regulation would offer maximum flexibility to the 
regulator and therefore lead to maximal welfare they also assume that it would be complicated to 
implement in practice as in-depth knowledge about local retail demand and cost structures as well as 
competitive retail market interaction would be necessary. Optimal regulated per area access prices 
would maximize per area welfare while ensuring that investment in the areas is viable (both for the SIA 
and the DIA case defining separate prices). As welfare in SIA areas decreases with the access 
charge, the SIA access charge is set just high enough to make an incumbent operator break even with 
its total area profits when investing. If its retail profits would be higher than the investment cost, the 
optimal access charge would be zero. The socially optimal extent of the SIA region is shown to 
correspond to the SIA region which would also develop when the operator could set monopoly access 
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 http://berec.europa.eu/doc/publications/consult_erg_geo_markets_2008/fastweb.pdf 
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 Also, some regulators have imposed some form of uniformity of retail prices. Valletti et al. (2002) show that in 
the context of universal service a uniform retail pricing obligation is creating strategic links between areas that 
would otherwise remain unrelated. The paper shows that uniform retail pricing leads to lower equilibrium coverage 
of both incumbent and entrants. The effect depends also on the regulatory context of other universal service 
policies such as price caps or coverage constraints. For instance, in presence of a minimum coverage obligation 
the effect may be compensated, but the measure would lead to an increase of (uniform) prices. Anton et al. 
(1999), Choné et al. (2000, 2002) and Foros & Kind (2003) find similar effects. Hoernig (2006) arrives at similar 
results by stating that a uniform price imposed on the incumbent would reduce its coverage as it seeks to avoid 
duopoly entry. If imposed on entrants it reduces the incentive for duopoly entry and may lead to independent 
regional monopolies. 
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charges freely as it would extend its network as long as this is profitably possible too (i.e. the last 
covered SIA region would optimally have regulated access prices at monopoly level).  
In DIAs on the other hand duplicative investment incentives exist as long as the investment cost in 
duplication is lower than the difference between expected DIA and SIA profits (for the incumbent, 
which does not provide access). Given the expected demand and cost functions and the SIA access 
charges, the socially optimal wholesale price can be calculated.  If the incumbents DIA retail profits 
with respect to its SIA profits (when not being the access provider) are sufficiently high, the DIA 
access price can be set to zero, maximising static welfare while safeguarding investment incentives. A 
particular case is given when the SIA access charges are set at marginal cost. In this case investment 
in duplication would incur high opportunity costs in addition to investment costs which could not be 
compensated by any benefit. In this case, the optimal DIA charge would also be zero and investments 
in duplication would be unprofitable as no additional wholesale profits or additional retail profits could 
be generated. Duplication in this case brings no social benefits. In the market model used by the 
authors it is shown than duplication is optimal in no area when SIA access prices have been chosen 
optimally per area. Finally, it is shown that cost-based access prices (LRIC) per area are higher than 
the described optimal SIA prices as they include by design a positive rent (which is incompatible with a 
zero profit condition), and as it does not take into account retail profits. LRIC is therefore problematic 
even if it would be applied per area.  
De Matos & Ferreira (2011) show in an endogenous entry market simulation with Cournot 
differentiated goods competition that geographically differentiated wholesale prices (areas are 
differentiated according to cost/competition) are socially optimal. At the same time, the authors state 
that in case of regional markets which are not independent implementation of geographic regulation 
becomes a highly complex task. Interdependencies may be justified by economies of scale and scope 
and network effects, or as will be shown later, by uniform (retail) pricing obligations. In particular, 
deregulation of the more competitive areas may trigger unexpected consequences such as a change 
to a monopoly situation in an adjacent market. They also show that therefore a deregulation of a 
subset of regions based on an ―N-plus‖ rule of thumb (Xavier, 2010)
38
 is not sufficient to guarantee that 
the introduction of geographic remedies is welfare enhancing.  
The problem of interdependencies raised by De Matos & Ferreira (2011) is largely avoided by 
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) by setting independent per area cost structures and by not 
considering network effects.     
 
In Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) with duplication-based regulated access prices instead, 
different access charges in SIAs and DIAs are set, but the charges does not vary between areas with 
different investment cost requirements (or between providers). No European NRA has to date 
implemented such an approach purely (rule of thumb) as it is assumed that the number of operators is 
not the only driver of competition. Furthermore, no NRA has proposed differing directly regulated 
access prices based on a single methodology according to competition. Such an approach is less 
flexible than pure geographic remedies and therefore implies lower social surplus as optimally charges 
should vary also across cost clusters as has been shown above. Duplication-based regulated access 
prices have the advantage, however, to be more transparent and easier to implement for NRAs.   
As before in Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) show that the effect of an increase of both SIA 
and DIA access charges on welfare is ambiguous. An increase in SIA access charges leads to a loss 
of static efficiency in the concerned areas, an increase in coverage and possible welfare gains from 
transforming SIA in DIA areas via opportunity costs. However, this last effect is positive only if 
increased competition outweighs the costs of additional investment. On the other hand, an increase in 
DIA charges would decrease static efficiency in DIA areas while also having an effect on the 
transformation of SIAs in DIAs via potential wholesale revenues. This last effect again is positive only 
                                               
38
 Such are rule would foresee that the threshold number of firms below which regulatory remedies remain. 
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if increased competition outweighs the costs of additional investment. If this is not the case, then the 
regulator should set the DIA access charge to zero in order to limit duplication.  
One feature of this analytical framework is that optimality conditions are such that there is a positive 
correlation between the socially optimal SIA and DIA access charge. Setting a very low SIA access 
price (increasing opportunity cost, lowering DIA investment incentives) would imply also lowering DIA 
access charges. This as low SIA access prices imply an already high per area welfare, meaning that 
the net benefit of extending the DIA area decreases substantially and that the regulator should reduce 
its incentives to invest in duplication by lowering also DIA access prices.  
In equilibrium, finally, using the market model the authors find that optimal regulated SIA access 
charges are set above cost. DIA access charges, however, should be set above cost only in case of 
sufficient differentiation. Otherwise, the social benefit of duplication is insufficient to cover investment 
costs. Also, the market model predicts that optimal access charges in SIA regions are to be set higher 
than in DIA areas in order to provide investment incentives but keeping static welfare losses in DIA as 
low as possible. Also it is shown also in this case that (SIA) LRIC would not be optimal and tend to 
lead to too low access charges reducing welfare.   
ii) Geographical segmentation of remedies  
The European regulatory framework provides the possibility to impose a lighter set of access remedies 
in more competitive areas. From a legal point of view, this can be the consequence of a national 
market definition (with regional remedies) but theoretically also of geographic segmentation of 
markets. Popular examples of geographic differentiation of remedies may be the cited cases of the 
Spanish and Polish WBA markets where the NRAs proposed to lift cost-orientation in more 
competitive areas, imposing essentially only an access obligation to prevent foreclosure.  
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) assume that the regulator could maintain (welfare 
maximising) price regulation in SIA areas while imposing only an access obligation in DIA areas. 
Typically in this case wholesale access prices in DIA areas would then be freely negotiated. If the 
entrant feels, however, that the access price is exceeding a level that it allows to enter the market 
sustainably it may under the access obligation ask the regulator to impose a price based on a dispute 
resolution procedure. The regulator would then impose a DIA access charge lower than the 
foreclosing price and then set the corresponding optimal SIA access charge. With this procedure the 
incumbents would compete freely on the access price, provided it falls below the dispute settlement 
price.  
Adjusting slightly the game setting (Bertrand competition with homogenous goods at wholesale level, 
where the entrant chooses the more convenient offer) Bourreau, Hombert, Pouyet and Schutz (2011) 
show that in an unregulated environment the softening effect makes the rival not providing wholesale 
access to a more aggressive retail competitor (setting lower prices) leading to multiple equilibria. The 
new wholesale profits have to be traded-off against possible losses of retail profits due to increased 
retail competition and demand expansion effects due to differentiation. This means that it is not always 
optimal to provide access, that undercutting at wholesale level is not always optimal and that the usual 
Bertrand result at wholesale level does generally not hold. It should be noted, however, that the 
softening effect disappears in case of full differentiation (i.e. independent goods) as then softening 
competition with relatively higher retail prices would not lead to higher wholesale revenues. When the 
softening effect is present though, Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) show that a low access 
charge implies higher profits for an access provider than for the rival which is not providing access. 
When the access charge is high enough, in turn, the contrary holds. This means that in a DIA setting 
there may be an access price below which giving access is more profitable than not giving access. 
Undercutting prices at wholesale level is therefore always an individual best response triggering a race 
to the bottom for providing wholesale services between the incumbents leading to marginal cost prices 
for both operators. In the market model used by the authors this equilibrium is unique when services 
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are sufficiently differentiated and the expected dispute settlement prices are sufficiently low. If instead 
services are sufficiently homogeneous, the access prices of both operators will be set at the second 
equilibrium such that profits of providing or not providing access are equalised (and the access charge 
is above marginal costs). In this case no operator would again have an incentive to deviate. Finally, 
instead if the dispute settlement price is set sufficiently high, both incumbents may prefer not to make 
feasible offers (third equilibrium) but expect the regulator to set access prices hoping it will 
subsequently not be chosen for access provision. This is in particular the case when the expected 
dispute settlement price is higher than the access price that equalises anticipated duopoly profits with 
the profits generated ex-post when providing access in the DIA area at the profit maximising access 
prices (subject to the condition that the entrant is not foreclosed). 
Finally, with both sufficient product homogeneity and a low enough dispute settlement price one firm 
offers a monopoly access price, while the other makes no feasible offer. An anticipated low dispute 
settlement price can therefore unexpectedly lead to monopoly prices.  
Using the market model the authors then show how socially optimal prices could be enforced.  If the 
socially optimal access charge is below the access price that equalises profits of providing and not 
providing access, the race to the bottom of DIA access prices must be stopped as strong competition 
has a too negative effect on investment incentives lowering welfare. The race to the bottom can only 
be stopped by setting a price floor at the socially optimal access price. If instead the socially optimal 
price is higher, it can in many cases be enforced by setting the dispute settlement price at the socially 
optimal price. In case, however, that the socially optimal access price is lower than the access price 
that equalises anticipated ex ante duopoly profits with the profits generated ex post when providing 
access in the DIA area at profit maximising access price (subject to the condition that the entrant is not 
foreclosed), this price cannot be achieved in equilibrium without further instruments.  
Geographically segmented remedies can therefore lead to a socially optimal outcome. Whether this 
outcome is achieved or not depend on the details of how such regulation is implemented (especially 
for instance whether floors and caps are imposed). Overall this type of regulation seems to have 
similar informational requirements to the other approaches proposed to maximise local welfare.  
2.5. Conclusion 
In the preceding sections the effects of geographically segmented regulation have been analysed in 
detail. Simplifying, the typical welfare effects of geographic regulation options that can be inferred by 
the existing literature are represented in  
Table 2. 
 
Static welfare  
(competition) 
Dynamic efficiency 
(investment incentives  
in SIA and DIA) 
Total welfare 
 
Geographically segmented 
regulated welfare-maximising 
access prices according to 
investment cost and competition 
Optimal  Optimal 
Optimal  
(even if in the market 
model this implies no 
duplication) 
Geographically segmented LRIC 
prices according to investment 
cost and competition (SIA) 
Suboptimal  Suboptimal 
Suboptimal  
(but better than uniform 
LRIC
39
) 
Geographically segmented 
remedies 
Can be optimal Can be optimal 
Can be optimal 
(depends on mechanism) 
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Uniform/geographically 
segmented cost-oriented access 
price regulation  
(at marginal cost) 
Suboptimal 
(but optimal in 
already covered 
areas) 
Suboptimal Suboptimal 
Uniform above cost access price 
regulation (including LRIC) 
Suboptimal Suboptimal 
Suboptimal  
(but better than marginal 
cost-oriented) 
Uniform full deregulation Suboptimal Suboptimal Suboptimal 
Geographically segmented full 
deregulation 
Suboptimal Suboptimal Suboptimal 
Geographically segmented prices 
according to competition only 
Suboptimal Suboptimal Suboptimal 
Geographically segmented LRIC 
prices according to competition 
only 
Suboptimal Suboptimal Suboptimal 
 
Table 2 - Welfare effects of different geographic regulation tools 
In light of the reviewed literature summarized above and the practical cases considered it is possible 
to draw conclusions for all identified regulatory options of geographically segmented regulation.  
Geographic full deregulation 
As has been shown, various NRAs have proceeded to full deregulation of some areas of the country 
(Austria, Finland, Portugal, Switzerland and UK). Different authors have argued that geographic (full) 
deregulation may lead to foreclosure. While Lestage & Flacher (2010) argue that this is possible even 
in SIA areas in case there is substantial quality advantage on the potential second incumbent, 
Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) argue that this possibility may be given, but only in DIA areas 
and only in case of low (horizontal) differentiation. Regulators should therefore use this tool with 
caution. 
Geographical segmentation of access prices  
In regulatory practice in Europe uniform above-cost access price regulation (e.g. LRIC) is still a 
commonly applied remedy (e.g. WBA in Sweden). The theoretical literature shows clearly that uniform 
access price regulation is no longer optimal, in particular in case of a roll-out of new infrastructures 
under geographically varying costs leading to geographically differentiated market structures. In 
particular local investment incentives are not sufficiently taken into account. Instead, Bourreau, 
Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) show that welfare optimizing prices would vary according to investment 
cost levels and competition and should be largely set be the regulator. No European NRA has to date, 
however, used a coherent geographically differentiated access price model according to the level of 
investment cost and competition. A first step towards such an optimal solution is however made by  
the Dutch regulation. Geographically segmented fibre access prices according to investment cost 
(even though not according to competition) were defined resulting in access prices ranging from 16 to 
26€ per month per unbundled fibre line depending on the cost cluster. Surprisingly the decision has to 
date received few attention regarding this particular aspect by other regulators in Europe, BEREC or 
the European Commission. It should be noted that such a regulation can be close to a solution which 
also differentiates prices according to competitive conditions as it is likely that in the urban areas 
where Reggefiber deploys such conditions may be rather homogeneous (cable competition). The 
question is then rather whether the price imposed by the authority is also welfare optimal.  
Also regarding segmentation of regulation according to competitive conditions no pure SIA/DIA 
distinction has been adopted yet, as the European Commission judges such ―rules of thumb‖ to 
insufficiently represent the level of competition. In light of the above regulators and researchers should 
consider increasing their efforts to evaluate possibilities to approach current access price regulation to 
a feasible form of socially optimal geographically segmented access price regulation. The benefits in 
case of success would be important. Today, for instance, higher uniform access charges would lead to 
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both higher total coverage as well as more duplication. Regulators are therefore currently facing a 
trade-off on whether to increase such access charges to incentivise investment (e.g. with risk premia 
on top of cost-based regulated prices) or not. In such a situation regulatory action may well depend on 
the subjective preferences of regulators, or in other words on how much competition they are ready to 
sacrifice in order to induce investments in more rural areas. A regulator could for example also decide 
to only target static welfare (competition), by imposing marginal cost access prices. These preferences 
may be an additional driver of the state of broadband networks in European countries today, 
representing the result of past investments decisions (seeFigure 1 – Actual xDSL Speeds in 
Europe (Source: Samknows, March 2012) Figure 1). When adopting an optimal regulatory regime 
of setting welfare-maximising SIA and DIA charges in all areas (such that SIA and DIA investment is 
viable and static welfare maximised), regulators would need to take into account the degree of product 
differentiation at retail level, investment costs and retail competition. Imposing optimal prices would 
lead to a total coverage which is maximal and to maximum static welfare per area (lower prices would 
mean that entry would not have been viable and welfare could not have been generated in the first 
place). When a geographically segmented access pricing approach could be adopted the regulators 
dilemma of trading-off static and dynamic efficiency would therefore be solved.  
Reaching this objective seems a complex task and may require a long time for the development of 
appropriate regulatory instruments. It should be considered whether current regulation would not have 
simple options to make small steps in this direction.  
In the framework of Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) it is shown that a local SIA LRIC price is 
not optimal as it includes a positive rent (and also the incumbents retail profits are not considered) and 
therefore it is higher than the price necessary to make local investment viable. Regulators, however, to 
date essentially use uniform LRIC prices. While Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) do not 
explicitly show this, their results can be interpreted such that local LRIC prices are leading to higher 
welfare than uniform LRIC. This is the case as in urban areas a local LRIC price would already exceed 
both marginal cost as well as a price that would make the investment viable (as it includes a positive 
rent. In case of uniform SIA LRIC prices the prices applied in urban areas will usually be much higher 
than local LRIC prices as a national cost base is considered. Therefore in urban areas uniform SIA 
LRIC prices would be such that welfare could be increased by decreasing the SIA access price 
towards local LRIC as the investment would continue to be viable and static efficiency would be 
enhanced. Conversely, in rural areas a uniform SIA LRIC price would likely exceed marginal costs but 
may in many cases be lower than the price that would make a SIA investment viable. In such areas an 
increase in the price could trigger investment and lead to higher welfare. In other rural areas, 
especially where investments have already taken place an increase of the charge towards local LRIC 
might, however, have the only consequence to reduce static efficiency. Overall, however, a scheme, 
which for instance would approach regulated price in urban areas to local LRIC while leaving the 
access charges in rural areas unchanged would be invariably welfare enhancing. Interesting this is 
largely corresponding to the practical implementation of the Dutch regulation, which foresees local 
tariffs in parallel to national tariffs. Regarding implementation the circumstance than in the Netherlands 
an operator can only choose one of the two tariff models may, however, distort this result and 
potentially lead nevertheless to welfare losses in rural areas. When compared to theory the regulator 
would then still need to develop a potential regulatory strategy for DIA cases. Overall, however, the 
Dutch approach seems to be largely supported by the literature.  
Geographical segmentation of remedies  
Recently introduced risk premia show that there is increasing awareness at the political level that 
investment incentives may be currently insufficient. However, a clear link of the extent of the premia to 
the dynamics of optimal local investment incentives is to date lacking and a significant debate on 
(partial) de-averaging of regulated wholesale access prices according to cost clusters seems still not 
to be taking place. Since 2008, however, several regulation proposals and decisions of member states 
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not only of geographic full deregulation (as described above) but also of geographic segmentation of 
remedies have been observed leading in their result to (to some extent) geographically differentiated 
wholesale prices. The latter approach consists in practice mostly in imposing an access-only 
obligations in urban areas implying some form of retail-minus regulation, avoiding foreclosure of the 
entrant, and standard cost-based regulation in rural areas (e.g. Spain, Poland). 
Given the informational requirements on setting welfare-optimizing geographically segmented access 
prices, Bourreau, Cambini, et al. (2012b) analysed whether a set of geographically segmented 
remedies can also achieve maximal welfare. In practice they proposed to largely deregulate DIA prices 
defining a dispute settlement procedure, which would prevent foreclosure of access seekers in case 
no viable access price results on the free market (corresponding to an access-only obligation). 
Foreseeing the market outcome the regulator would then need to set a welfare maximising SIA 
charges as well. 
This type of deregulation may, however, have unwanted consequences. For instance (for sufficiently 
heterogeneous products) in DIA areas a race to the bottom for wholesale access prices may result in 
equilibrium. But too strong competition on the wholesale level may not be socially optimal as at some 
point investment incentives are reduced in a way to reduce overall welfare. Hence, there may be 
cases where a DIA access price of zero may not be socially optimal and the regulator should step in to 
prevent too strong wholesale competition setting a price floor at the socially optimal DIA price. As 
currently regulators still focus on maximising competition, this proposal is in contrast with current 
regulation. Furthermore, when the socially optimal access price instead is high (and above the DIA 
equilibrium price) it can be achieved in some cases by setting the dispute settlement price equal to the 
socially optimal price. In other cases also further instruments would be necessary. Overall it seems 
that there would be few cases when the socially optimal charge would be reached spontaneously on 
the market. While the regulator could add safeguards to ensure socially optimal prices (such as a price 
floor and cap) this would imply similar informational requirements as with geographic segmentation of 
regulated access prices. Regarding price floors it should be noted that to date no major practical case 
has received attention where access prices have been set by a regulated firm below the regulated 
dispute settlement prices. Even though this example seems not encouraging, regulators and 
researchers should try to further evaluate feasible dispute settlement processes able to lead to socially 
optimal prices.  
To conclude, many issues still remain to be explored. Methods to approximate socially optimal SIA 
and DIA access charges and to implement them should be the focus of future research. Other subjects 
of interest may include the structural assumptions of the models explaining the effects of geographic 
regulation. For instance, only static settings are currently analysed and regulatory commitment could 
be a problem. Also, possible strategic links between areas due to scale and scope economies, 
network effects or uniform retail price obligations are not sufficiently considered. Moreover, a legacy 
infrastructure an investment sharing options should be present integrating the migration debate 
described in the introduction.  Also, alternative competition models could be considered as well as 
endogenous entry in an extended theoretical model. Finally horizontal and vertical differentiation play 
a key role. The two alternative hypotheses of the source of vertical differentiation (service or 
infrastructure) in Lestage and Flacher (2010) indicate that researchers and regulators may still need to 
uncover the driving forces of innovation in the broadband market.     
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3. NGA Co-investment models 
The roll-out of next generation access networks implies the largest investments in telecommunications 
since the beginning of the 20
th
 century, when the copper telephone access networks were deployed by 
the state. In the preceding chapter operators were assumed to fully duplicate infrastructure when they 
would roll-out second NGA network. This is, however, not always necessary as operators can also 
invest jointly and share investment cost. This chapter will review joint roll-out possibilities and risk 
sharing agreements in general.  In this introductory section, the extent of investment requirement is 
described and put into perspective.  
Elixmann, Ilic, Neumann and Plückebaum (2008) show that single fibre
40
 deployment costs are as high 
as 2’100€ per home connected ( 
Table 3) even in a very urban cluster (Germany). There are, however, countries with substantially 
lower deployment costs in such areas such as Italy (1’160€). There are different reasons for this as 
differing construction costs across countries, differing existing duct and aerial cabling and their 
corresponding access conditions
41
 and network topology. In particular, in addition, investment costs for 
in-house cabling are supposed to be higher in northern than in southern countries.  
 Germany France Sweden Portugal Spain Italy Switzerland 
FTTH investment cost 
(homes connected) 2’111€ 2’025€ 1’333€ 1’548€ 1’882€ 1’160€ 
1’643€  
(2’465 Fr.)
42
 
FTTH investment cost 
(homes passed) 919€ 930€ 530€ 776€ 859€ 504€ - 
 
Table 3 – Fibre Greenfield deployment costs per home connected and passed, FTTH P2P (source: WIK) 
Investment comparisons per home passed follow a similar pattern. Homes connected consider also 
costs that are incurred to activate a customer’s connection which include in-house cabling, customer 
premises equipment and trunk cards
43
. The investment is in this case, distributed on an expected 
target market, i.e. 50% of the potential customer base
44
 while for passed homes it is by definition 
distributed on 100%. Consequently, investment cost per home connected is higher than twice the 
investment cost per home passed. Overall, even in a small and dense country such as Switzerland full 
national coverage with a single fibre FTTH network would require investments as large as €14,3bn 
(connected homes)
45
. With 4.5m homes, this corresponds to a national average investment cost per 
home connected of around 3’200€ 
46
. These high costs are again driven by the fact that connections 
become exponentially more expensive as population density decreases towards rural areas. Ilic, 
Neumann and Plückebaum (2009) show that in Switzerland in this case the last (very rural) cluster 16 
                                               
40
 FTTH (P2P) 
41
 e.g. in France it is assumed that operators may to some extent use existing infrastructure (sewer systems) 
reducing Capex costs significantly (increasing Opex though). The case in Italy is similar where ducts, covering 
about 8% of the population, used by Telecom Italia to deploy a CATV network between 1995 and 1997 (Socrate 
project) were opened to competition by the Italian Antitrust authority in 2001. Free duct capacity was in the past 
mainly used by Fastweb. In the case of Switzerland, the model assumes that incumbent overall digging costs are 
reduced by 20% by the possibility of using existing ducts
41
. In practice it should be noted that an EVU may save 
even a larger part of these costs as in many cases their duct networks have sufficient space left for a roll-out of an 
FTTH network.  
42
 Ilic, Neumann and Plückebaum (2009) show that in Switzerland the investment per home connected in an 
urban area (the comparable cluster is cluster cluster 2) is 1’642€ per month. There it is however considered that 
FTTH would reach a market share of 75% and not 50% as this is more realistic in the Swiss case. Calculating a 
comparable value deployment costs in Switzerland would be around 2’000€ and therefore comparable to 
Germany or France. The exchange rate was assumed to be 1.50 Fr./€.  When applying a more recent 2013 
exchange rate (1.20 Fr./€) deployment costs would be comparably highest with around 2’500€.  
43
 In the Swiss case in-house cabling is also included in homes passed. 
44
 in Switzerland in the baseline model foresees 75%, the value in the table is adjusted to 50% though 
45
 21,4 Mrd. Fr. 
46
 4’800 Fr. 
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requires 10 times higher investments per access than the urban cluster 1 (around 1’320€). In the last 
cost cluster, then, it is shown that subsidies of around 11’000€
47
 per home connected would be 
required to make an investment viable. 
3.1. Regulatory principles in Europe 
Improvement of competitiveness of the duct market 
In this section possible ways to reduce investment costs for any type of investor (single investor or co-
investment partner) will be explored. In light of the monumental investment cost described a prominent 
question in the recent political debate in Europe was if there is anything that can be done to reduce 
investments required for an NGA and in particular a FTTH roll-out for all operators. The European 
Commission (2013) has recently published a legislative proposal to reduce the cost of rolling out high 
speed communication infrastructures in Europe. The initiative concentrates on civil engineering costs 
(i.e. digging up roads and lay down fibre) as around 80% of deployment costs seem to be associated 
with it. The European Commission hopes thereby to reduce investment requirements via efficiencies 
by 20-30%. The adoption by EU Parliament plenary vote is expected in the beginning of 2014.   
The European Commission’s proposals include the following specific measures:  
i) Telecoms operators should have the right to access the physical infrastructures of other 
network industries (e.g. electricity, water, sewage, transport) to deploy high-speed networks. 
ii) Telecoms NRAs should be able to take binding decisions in case of a dispute and act as a 
single information point dealing with information on infrastructures and permit applications. 
iii) All newly-constructed buildings and those that undergo major renovation would be required to 
be equipped with “high-speed broadband-ready” in-building physical infrastructure. 
 
Essentially this proposal gives telecoms NRAs full control over the duct market. In practice, the draft 
regulation would firstly require all utility companies (such as electricity, gas, water, sewage, heating 
and transport) to meet reasonable requests by telecoms companies for access to their physical 
infrastructure in order to deploy high-speed networks. In the event that there are no legitimate reasons 
to reject the request (e.g. availability of space, security, interferences), the access seeking operator 
may request access at fair and non-discriminatory terms, i.e. at conditions and charges to be set (by 
default) by the telecoms NRA. Moreover, when performing civil works, companies which are partly or 
fully publicly financed would be required to meet reasonable requests from telecoms companies for 
coordination of and participation in civil works. Secondly, a set of rules is laid down regarding the 
access to information about these facilities. The minimum information which operators of such network 
must provide to a single point of contact operated by the NRA include i) location, routes and geo-
coordinates of the infrastructure, ii) the size, type and current use of the infrastructure and iii) the name 
of the owner of the infrastructure and a final contact point. Applications for permits for civil engineering 
work for telecoms operators will be made over a coordinating single point of contact electronic platform 
operated by the NRA. Moreover, local authorities are requested to answer any request within six 
months. Thirdly, all newly-constructed buildings and buildings undergoing major renovation would be 
required to be equipped with high-speed broadband-ready in-building physical infrastructure. While it 
is unclear which technologies are included in this definition, it seems reasonable to think that 
traditional copper in-house wiring is excluded.  
It can be expected that in many countries where such measures have not yet been applied, this 
proposal may lead to additional NGA investments using alternative duct infrastructures. As in many 
cases, entities operating duct infrastructures (other than telecoms operators) are publicly controlled – 
often by local authorities - and not necessarily operating in a profit maximizing environment, an access 
obligation can be reasonable in order to ensure potential entry in the broadband market via alternative 
                                               
47
 16’411 Fr.  
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network ducts. In addition, the proposal aims at increasing transparency and reducing bureaucratic 
costs. However, even if the potential investment cost reductions indicated by the European 
Commission are fully realised (20-30%) and single, duplicate and co-invested coverage is increased, 
the required investments in FTTH will remain very high and a profitable full coverage will remain 
unfeasible. 
NGN co-investments 
While the European Commissions’ legislative proposal (2013) addresses generic possibilities to 
reduce operator deployment costs, cooperative investment may reduce investment cost further in case 
of a roll-out of more than one operator in an area. The most typical case would be in areas where two 
operators decide to roll-out fully in parallel
48
. With a joint roll-out and mutual access agreements the 
total investment incurred may be reduced substantially. Such a co-investment agreement, as will be 
shown, would not necessarily imply less flexibility for the operators or reduce competition. 
NGA investment cooperations in Europe have been discussed by the NGA Recommendation of the 
European Commission which states that co-investments and risk-sharing mechanisms should be 
promoted. Such schemes are also analysed in BEREC (2012a)
49
. It is shown that to date there are few 
practical examples of co-investments in Europe and even less examples of interventions by regulatory 
or competition authorities on the conditions of such agreements. Cooperations have been registered 
only in France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland and they only account for a small portion of 
total FTTH deployments in Europe yet. BEREC (2012a) describes that NGA investment cooperations 
usually foresee two components. On one side the mutual access terms and on the other obligations 
regarding the roll-out, i.e. which part of the network an operator is responsible to construct and give 
access to to the other operator. In some cases such agreements are purely financial where one of the 
partners does not need to roll-out infrastructure or give access to its existing or future infrastructure at 
all. In case of joint-ventures, which is the strongest form of cooperation, investment costs and profits 
are shared under some rule and the entity would act independently, but as one single firm.  
Both the European Commission (in an earlier draft version of the NGA recommendation
50
) and 
BEREC are concerned with possible limiting effects of such cooperations on competition. BEREC 
(2012a) notes that “whether a market with more than two operators (e.g. three or four) may be 
compatible with competition depends however on numerous factors and in particular on the level of 
independence that these operators enjoy, especially within a co-investment agreement. While such a 
situation has to be assessed in detail in a market analysis or while national authorities may adapt more 
specific guidelines in this respect it may be said in general that if sufficient independence between the 
operators is ensured, a market with more than two, i.e. three or more, operators may under optimal 
circumstances raise low concerns about collusion and the competitive situation".  
Of the different sharing regimes considered the BEREC report assumes that sale of long term IRUs 
(indefeasible rights of use) on a fibre in a multifibre network to a competitor may be regarded as 
largely equivalent for it to controlling a fully independent own network
51
. Similarly to a case where 
infrastructure is fully duplicated, it is in the current regulatory framework possible that co-investments 
lead to sufficient competition in the market for wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access to 
                                               
48
 I.e. in separate duct systems 
49
 A detail review can be found in annex 2 
50
 The European Commission stated in annex III of the second draft of the NGA recommendation that to create 
sufficient upstream competition co-investment agreements need to be i) based on multifibre, ii) partners should 
have strictly cost-oriented access, iii) they must effectively compete downstream and iv) sufficient duct capacity 
must be installed. Also a sufficient number of access providers would be necessary (three or four). This draft is no 
longer available on the European Commission homepage.  
51
 This view is shared by the EC in the NGA recommendation where it is stated that ―multiple fibre lines allow 
alternative operators each to fully control their own connection up to the end-user. In addition access seekers can 
obtain full control over fibre lines, without risking discriminatory treatment in case of mandated single fibre 
unbundling.‖ 
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justify full deregulation of LLU (copper as well as fibre). Overall, it can be assumed that co-investment 
schemes may lower duplication costs and increase duopoly coverage, while having potentially 
negative effects compared to traditional duplication.  
Multifibre deployment 
Ilic, Neumann and Plückebaum (2009) estimate costs and potential network coverage under different 
scenarios. Compared to a single fibre network they explain multifibre networks and relevant cost 
drivers as follows:  
- In-house wiring: The higher number of fibres implies the deployment of larger cables 
(depending on the number of fibres per home, e.g. four) and more splicing work at the building 
entry point.  
- Drop cable deployment: In the drop segment of the access network (i.e. between the 
distribution and the building entry point) larger cables have to be deployed. Ducts, however, 
are here dimensioned in the model in a way that they could hold cables both in case of single 
and multiple fibre lines and there are no additional construction costs involved.  
- Distribution point: Contrary to the single fibre case a distribution point where all operators have 
the possibility to connect drop multifibre lines has to be installed and every participating 
operator has to conduct splicing work.  
- MPoP: In case of handover to the other operator at the more distant local metropolitan point of 
presence level (MPoP) and not at distribution point level, the network operating partner has to 
install additional feeder capacity and splice fibres through at the distribution point. This may 
imply constructing larger feeder ducts. At the MPoP the fibres also have to be connected to 
the respective optical distribution frames. 
The additional costs for an operator to deploy a multifibre networks therefore depend on where the 
access point (splice closure) for alternative operators is installed. When compared to a single fibre 
network in the Swiss market Ilic, Neumann and Plückebaum (2009) estimate additional investment 
necessary for a multifibre network (before any interconnection of alternative operators) at around 12% 
(cluster 1) decreasing to around 2% (cluster 16) for handover at distribution point level (i.e. multifibre 
up to the distribution point). In case of handover at MPoP level (i.e. multifibre up to the MPoP) the 
additional investments required would be of 26% (cluster 1) and 12% (cluster 16). When considering 
the first six (urban) clusters, overall the multifibre model would imply around 9% higher investments in 
case of distribution point handover and 18% higher investments in case of MPoP handover. Intuitively, 
in rural areas the investment share of the drop segment increases (longer lines). As in the drop 
segment no additional investments for cables in case of multifibre are assumed to be necessary the 
relative additional investment for multifibre decreases towards rural areas.  
What has to be considered also, however, is that once an operator is granted access to the multifibre 
network, it also has to invest in order to connect to the network. In case of distribution point handover, 
for instance, the alternative operator would need to duplicate investments to reach the distribution 
point. The estimated costs by Ilic, Neumann and Plückebaum (2009) are representing this, meaning 
that for a four fibre network and distribution point handover, total investment requirements increase 
with the number of cooperation partners connecting to the network. For instance in the first six clusters 
with distribution point handover the total investment requirement for a multifibre network increases by 
21% (from 4’124 Fr. to 4’996 Fr.) with one cooperation partner (instead of none). Considering the 
above, the MPoP solution can be socially optimal in cases when multfibre backhaul is more efficient 
than duplicate network backhaul. In fact in the Swiss case even though there was an extended debate 
on this, several cooperation partners agreed on handover at MPoP level. The cost estimates of Ilic, 
Neumann and Plückebaum (2009) are broadly in line with other estimates of Polynomics (2009) which 
estimated additional costs of 10% for multifibre networks and of the Swiss incumbent Swisscom 
estimating additional costs of 10 to 30%, depending on the case considered.  Considering the above a 
possible national multifibre obligation as discussed in Switzerland might therefore raise costs also in 
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monopoly areas reducing typically total coverage to some extent. These additional costs to society 
need to be traded off against benefits.  
The European Commission’s acknowledges the potential of multifibre in its NGA Recommendation 
(2010) stating that multifibre has several advantages and may be conducive to long term sustainable 
competition. It is stated that multifibre 
- allows partners full control of their own connection up to the end user  
- enables  an  end-user  to  subscribe  simultaneously  to  several  service providers  connected  
at  the  physical  layer,  which  could  in  turn  help  develop  new applications;  
- facilitates  churn,  since  no  manual  cross-connection  operation  is  needed  at  the  
concentration point, any churn request may be dealt with without any down time  
- lowers operating costs when compared to a single fibre FTTH scenario; 
- ensures that access seekers can obtain full control over fibre lines, without risking 
discriminatory treatment in case of mandated single fibre unbundling. 
 
The main use for the customer in urban areas is therefore that a multifibre dose is installed at the 
home which allows potentially to choose one or more physical access provider simultaneously and 
easily switch between them (in Switzerland for instance four fibre connectors are installed). Cases 
where more than two operators are chosen simultaneously seem to date, however, rare in the Swiss 
market.  
Coverage 
Ilic, Neumann and Plückebaum (2009) assume a fixed average revenue per user of 57€ per month 
independently of the service purchased (single, double, triple play)
52
 and independently of the number 
of entrants. For Switzerland, it is then estimated that traditional fibre infrastructure competition, i.e. 
investment in two independent parallel networks, would be profitable in this case for up to 16% of 
households. Using multifibre co-investments it is estimated that this coverage can be increased to up 
to 54% of households
53
. Surprisingly, even four operators would be economically viable under these 
assumptions for 36% of households
54
. These results are, however, assuming certainty of (symmetric) 
market shares after investment. As such certainty is not given in reality the actual coverages may be 
significantly lower. Finally, (maximum) total coverage under these demand assumptions is given by 
the potential profitable coverage by a single operator roll-out (single fibre) at around 60% of 
households (corresponding to 8.3% of the national territory)
55
. In the model of Ilic, Neumann and 
Plückebaum (2009), it is therefore predicted that - even in presence of cable - about 60% of the 
population could profitably be covered by an FTTH network (single fibre) and that for a very large part 
of these accesses (54%) physical FTTH infrastructure competition on the basis of a multifibre co-
investment is viable
56
.  
3.2. Regulatory practices 
While co-investments can lead to operators having a comparable level of independence as in the case 
of a fully parallel roll-out, this is not necessarily the case. BEREC (2012a) distinguishes two forms of 
investment cooperations. On one side long-term cooperation agreements are considered where no 
common company is founded and access agreements are made for instance on a single fibre 
infrastructure or also under indefeasible rights of use (IRU) on dedicated fibres in case of multifibre.  
                                               
52
 Assuming 35 CHF for single play (telephony), 65 CHF for double play (telephony and broadband), triple play 80 
CHF (telephony, broadband and IPTV) and business 252 CHF, and applying services shares of 15%, 16%, 51% 
and 9%, an average ARPU per connection of 85 CHF results.  
53
 43% when handover is done at distribution point level instead of MPoP 
54
 16% when handover is done at distribution point level instead of MPoP 
55
 In case of single operator multifibre roll-out 54% of households (in both the MPoP and the distribution point 
scenario). 
56
 In the WIK model multifibre cooperations and costs structures do not affect total coverage. 
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On the other side the authors consider joint ventures, where the companies take equity stakes 
carrying jointly the full financial risk of the investment and reselling wholesale products jointly to the 
shareholders as well as possible downstream outsiders. 
Long term cooperation agreements 
Typically, many co-investment cases observed to date in Europe have foreseen limitations to 
independence and flexibility of participating operators. The following horizontal agreements part of 
NGA multifiber long-term cooperation agreements had for example been notified under objection 
proceedings to the Swiss competition commission
57
: 
- Layer 1 exclusivity (notified in all major cities) foreseeing a clause whereby a partner 
commits not to give access at layer 1 to third parties 
- Compensation mechanisms (notified in all major cities except St. Gallen), foresee that from a 
certain degree of usage of the network a transfer payment between the partners is necessary 
- Investment protection clause (or non-discrimination of the partner) (notified in all major 
cities), foresees that access products cannot be offered at lower prices to third parties than to 
the partner 
- Information exchange clauses (notified in all major cities except St. Gallen)  
The Swiss competition authority has found that all these clauses (with the exception of information 
exchange) could potentially restrict competition. Such a finding could still be confuted by sufficient 
competition in the market (wholesale physical network infrastructure access and wholesale broadband 
access). However, in both markets, restricted to only fibre and including both dedicated and shared 
fibres, significant market power was found, especially for the technical problems making it difficult for 
cable operators to directly enter the market for wholesale physical network infrastructure access. 
Indirect effects through the retail market were supposed not to be sufficiently strong given that the only 
operator able to offer LLU on national level is supposed to be Swisscom. The competition authority  
was therefore unable to exclude an intervention in case the operators would agree and implement 
these clauses. Most clauses have subsequently been cancelled by the operators. BEREC (2012a) 
show that it is essential whether the investment cost is shared upfront or whether there are 
subsequent usage based charges transforming via the legal instrument of the co-investment 
potentially fixed costs in marginal costs manipulating competition. This is possible both in the case of 
long term access agreements as well as under joint venture.  
Unlike in Switzerland in France cooperation agreements are largely defined ex-ante by regulation. 
Consequently there is less space for intervention of the competition authority. Essentially, the French 
regulation foresees that any firm wanting to roll-out FTTH in an area consults the market (via NRA) for 
interested firms in layer 1 co-investments
58
. If there is interest by other operators to participate in such 
an investment, multifibre is rolled out (at least one fibre per co-investor) and the operators essentially 
participate bearing equal shares of the investment cost for the multifibre infrastructure between the 
home and the distribution point
59
. In exchange, they receive a long term indefeasible rights of use 
(IRU) which define access agreements largely equivalent to property.  
Independently of whether the roll-out took place by a co-investment or not, infrastructure operators in 
France must then provide (ex-post) access at reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to unbundling 
products at the distribution point. Differently to the co-investment such prices include a risk premium. 
This applies to very high density areas (i.e. communes with more than 250’000 population, where at 
                                               
57
 See BoR (12) 41, Wettbewerbskommission (RPW2012-2) 
58
 ARCEP Decision 2009-1106 of 22 December 2009 
59
 ARCEP Decision 2009-1106 of 22 December 2009, article 3 
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least 20% of the houses consist of more than 12 units
60
). There, the distribution points are set for 
houses with more than 12 units directly inside the building. Similar terms apply in non dense areas
61
 
where, however, the distribution point is much more distant (such as to collect more than 1’000 lines). 
The NRA therefore imposes a larger extent of shared network outside dense areas. As an example 
France Telecom and Free have signed an agreement in July 2011 where 5 million households should 
be reached outside very-high density areas by 2020. Legally the French approach is interesting as it 
regulates fibre access in a symmetric way (i.e. applied to any firm on the market independently of the 
competitive situation). Also, in Portugal Optimus and Vodafone both construct own independent NGA 
networks in different cities. An agreement foresees mutual access.  
 
Joint Ventures 
Structural joint ventures of multiple telecoms operators in Europe are rare. In this case operators 
jointly control a company and divide investment costs and profits. In Holland a Reggeborgh-KPN joint-
venture rolls-out an FTTH network. KPN, Reggefibre and other operators then buy access to layer 1 
products from the joint-venture at regulated prices. The price caps are differentiated according to cost 
(capex) levels ranging from 15.52€ to 25.99€ per month in 2013 (14 different areas proposed). As 
described in the earlier chapter these prices are the result of a DCF model taking into account cost 
and demand over the lifetime of the investment (the regulated price sets the net present value to zero).  
 
Also, under a proposed joint venture in Fribourg in Switzerland (Swisscom-Groupe E) other horizontal 
agreements have been rejected
62
 by the competition commission. In this case, the agreement would 
have foreseen that ducts would remain under the control of the respective partners and that non-
discriminatory wholesale offers are made. The competition authority had, however, ruled that the 
agreement would not constitute an independent new unit on the market taking over relevant assets of 
the partners – so-called full function joint venture - and considered therefore only the horizontal 
agreements. The main agreements were: 
- The joint ventures layer 1 access price
63
 is fixed over the whole term of the contract (same for 
co-investors as also third parties) in the agreement  
- There is a minimum order quantity for layer 1 products (same for co-investors as also third 
parties). I.e. small alternative operator could not provide sufficient scale and would not be 
served by the joint venture. 
- The operators fix a common price for access to their ducts (which remain under their 
respective control). 
- Both operators make bids to the joint-venture indicating total roll-out costs per area. A clause 
foresees that the costs taken into account – bid of the winning operator – are increased by a 
fixed agreed mark up.  
- The operators commit to not compete with the joint-venture operations at later stage 
- The sale of layer 1 access products at the building entry point to third parties is restricted 
 
The authority has shown that all these clauses could potentially reduce effective competition in the 
market for wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access. In June 2012 the joint-venture has 
adapted the clauses according to the decision of the authority. In order to ensure full coverage of the 
region, the Canton was requested to enter the capital of the joint-venture. The Cantonal Government 
had agreed to do so. At the same time Swisscom has decided to abandon the project and the 
cooperation form is now similar to the other Swiss agreements. Finally, in Italy Trentino NGN 
(controlled by the district authority) and Telecom Italia have set up a joint-venture where it would roll-
out in dense areas (70%), while Trentino NGN would roll-out alone in the rest of the area.  
                                               
60
 The decision states some further conditions for definition 
61
 ARCEP Decision 2010-1312 of 14 December 2010 
62
 Swiss Competition Commission. Case 41-0623: FTTH Freiburg 
63
 terminal segment, i.e. from the distribution point to the home.  
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Structurally as will be seen under a joint-venture the partners can control the access costs of all 
downstream players. Under (long term) access this is not the case, as the incumbent may always 
retain access at marginal cost.  
 
3.3. Review of Literature 
The essential question the literature explores is the effect that different regulated and unregulated co-
investment options have on investment, competition and welfare. As is the case with the applied 
regulatory work on the subject, theoretical and empirical literature essentially distinguish joint-ventures 
and (long term) access agreements. The key feature of a joint-venture is that the roll-out may be 
undertaken jointly and that the partners maximise joint profits and set a single downstream access 
charge for the partners (and a possibly different one for outside operators). While such agreements 
are generically considered to be co-investment agreements, it is not entirely clear which types of 
access agreements should be considered co-investments. In an access agreement, the (local) 
network remains under full control of an incumbent which gives access at a price possibly above 
marginal cost. In this an asymmetry in the market is created as the investor active on the downstream 
market may face only its marginal network cost upstream. It may consequently in these cases be 
impossible for the operators to reach efficient monopoly allocations as under joint-venture. In theory 
any above marginal cost access price may create additional rent (an investment contribution) for the 
investor supporting its investment. While many types of access options are considered by the co-
investment literature, only the subset of these agreements including an ex-ante fixed investment 
contribution are usually considered to be co-investments
64
, as in this case the investment risk can be 
equally shared. This section will, nevertheless, compare all joint-venture and (long-term) access 
options analysed. 
  
Most of the co-investment literature considers (ex-ante contracted) joint-ventures. One particular form 
of joint-ventures is when insiders can access the infrastructure at marginal cost (access price set by 
the regulator or by the partners), where the network therefore can be used freely after the investment 
has taken place. Typically such a configuration would lead to intense downstream competition. 
Cambini and Silvestri (2013) call this basic investment sharing
65
. Also, in addition to these broad 
categories of cooperation an intermediate case is considered. The access innovation literature 
considers the case where the joint-venture maximises joint profits setting a jointly optimal investment 
level, but where the competitor would not enjoy marginal cost access as the incumbent paying above-
marginal cost (regulated) prices.  
 
Regarding access agreements instead, a broad range of options is considered. Essentially, access 
charges can be fixed (independent of quantity) or linear or nonlinear in quantity (e.g. fixed plus a 
usage base charge together or a usage based charge with quantity discounts). Ex-ante is considered, 
as usual, to consist of contracts signed before the investment takes place, while ex-post contracts are 
signed afterwards. Fixed charges can be optional (i.e. are effectively paid only when access is actually 
requested, which may not be the case when demand turns out to be low ex-post) or non-optional (to 
be paid in any case). In addition charges can be unconditional or conditional on the market outcome 
and in particular the level of demand in case of uncertainty. All these access options can refer to 
prices on the free market as well as to regulated prices (e.g. LRIC, FDC or marginal cost). In addition 
                                               
64
 This seems in line with the definition given in the NGA recommendation: Co-investment in FTTH means an 
arrangement between independent providers of electronic communications services with a view to deploying 
FTTH networks in a joint manner, in particular in less densely populated areas. Co-investment covers different  
legal arrangements, but typically co-investors will build network infrastructure and share physical access to that 
infrastructure.  
65
 Usually in one way or the other marginal cost is born by the partners. Be it via the joint-venture or via own NGN 
marginal costs equal for both operators.  
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to the mentioned co-investment and access options often a benchmark case is considered where no 
access is possible.  
Essentially, the literature shows that co-investments can extend duopoly (and sometimes total) 
coverage but risks reducing competition. As welfare effects are therefore contradictory, the social 
desirability of a particular co-investment depends on the fine details of the co-investment agreement 
and the outside option to which it is compared: for instance, whether both operators have non-
discriminatory access to the infrastructure built, the regulatory environment, downstream competition, 
uncertainty, risk aversion, the structure of the access charges and the amount of investment required. 
Unsurprisingly, theoretical conclusions depend on the hypotheses assumed. It will be shown, however, 
that nevertheless conclusions and recommendations to date are largely consistent. The following 
section will provide an overview of the literature based on one basic paper (taking also into account 
geographic aspects) described initially. Table 9 in the annex summarizes the NGN co-investment 
options considered in the literature and the main assumptions and results of the respective papers.  
 
3.3.1. Co-investment under NGN regulation 
The most detailed analysis of co-investment (basic sharing) to date is provided by Bourreau, Cambini 
and Hoernig (2013). The authors use a similar model than Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012b) 
considering next to geographic effects also uncertainty
66
 and access to outsiders once the investment 
has been undertaken. However, unlike most other co-investment papers, the authors consider a 
Greenfield investment and therefore no migration effects from copper to NGA reducing model 
complexity (and practical relevance) to some extent but defining a good starting point for further 
analysis. While most other articles consider access regulation an alternative scenario to a co-
investment scheme, this article considers the two simultaneously.    
Regional incumbents can here decide on the extent of Greenfield NGN investments in their respective 
home areas. They invest up to the (most costly) area where gross profits can just cover the investment 
cost. They then announce their plans and can decide to what extent they would like to co-invest in the 
home area of the other incumbent - where investment cost would be split and access granted at 
marginal cost. This as the authors assume that higher internal access costs reducing competition 
would not be tolerated by the regulator (largely corresponding to the regulated ex-ante co-investments 
proposed by the French regulator). The paper also assumes that the co-investors then set jointly a 
local access charge to the co-invested infrastructure for the outsiders seeking access. The paper 
analyses the investment incentives for both total and duplicate/co-invested coverage that a co-
investment option creates in three market regulatory environments: no access (benchmark), traditional 
regulated (NGN) access and the free market (in duopoly areas only).  
When only (regulated or commercial) co-investment options exist (i.e. the outside option is that no 
access is granted), the only way to provide NGN products is by having access to their own 
infrastructure (be it via single roll-out, duplication or co-investment). In the case when the competitor 
can somehow share investment costs and then access the technology at marginal cost, as under 
duplication, operators would earn duopoly profits in the areas concerned (which are reduced 
compared to the profits in monopoly areas). The only difference being that the investment cost can 
now be shared, reducing the cost for duplication and extending the duopoly coverage (which is usually 
lower than the monopoly coverage) when compared to a case with no access option. Duplication 
would therefore be fully substituted by co-investment and the duopoly coverage extended. In line with 
the rest of the literature, which will be described, the paper concludes that usually total coverage is not 
affected by co-investment options. This might be case only when co-investment duopoly profits 
exceed monopoly profits, i.e. when a joint roll-out would lead to efficiencies reducing the total 
investment cost or when there is a strong demand expansion effect. Reasonably the former is not the 
                                               
66
 but assuming risk neutrality 
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case. For instance Schneir and Xiong (2012) show that additional investments would in reality be 
necessary in case of any co-investment, as infrastructure would need to be more flexible and 
necessitate more equipment to be able to host two partners (even when considering a relatively 
economic passive optical network (PON) FTTH infrastructure
67
). Regarding the latter, as in most other 
papers, differentiation is key. If goods are sufficiently differentiated the sum of gross profits of two 
active firms may despite increased competition be larger than the profit of a monopolist. When this 
effect is sufficiently strong to balance the likely increase in investment cost, an increase in total 
coverage might theoretically be possible when introducing the co-investment option (even when 
introducing only the possibility of duplication). In addition, it is shown that when the probability of low 
demand increases, not only both monopoly and duopoly coverages are reduced but also the 
difference between the two, meaning that a co-investment scheme would also reduce coverage risk.  
When instead traditional regulated ex-post
68
 access (uniform linear usage based fee both in monopoly 
and duopoly areas) is also granted and demand is high, partners would ask for access outside of co-
invested areas, i.e. in all areas where only single infrastructure is deployed. It is assumed that access 
is not asked for in case demand is low and that then profits would be the same as under no access. 
Here, it is assumed that also downstream entrant can enter on the retail market based on access 
regulation (both in single as well as co-invested areas) but also only in case of high demand. In such a 
case it is shown that usually an increase in the access charge increases both single and co-invested 
coverage. Then with respect to the no access case regulated access usually undermines investment 
incentives (total coverage) unless the regulated access charge is high and product differentiation too. 
Secondly, the introduction of regulated access is now an alternative to the co-investment creating an 
opportunity cost for a co-investors which reduce co-investment coverage (in the extreme case of 
access at marginal cost, there wouldn’t be any incentive to co-invest anymore independently of the 
investment cost). When deciding on whether to provide regulated access (instead of no access) to co-
investors the regulator therefore has to trade-off enhancing competition in single infrastructure areas 
with a reduction of incentives for co-investments, reducing infrastructure competition. The authors 
argue that a solution could be that regulated access is not provided to co-investment partners (only to 
downstream entrants), but this may not be feasible from a legal and practical point of view.  
Finally, investment incentives are analysed under voluntary access, where in co-invested areas due to 
infrastructure competition access prices are fully deregulated (regional regulation) while traditional 
regulation remains in place in single infrastructure areas. In this case the co-investors will allow local 
access only when profitable, thereby weakly increasing their local profits. Co-investment coverage 
therefore increases with respect to both the no access as well as the regulated access scenario (while 
voluntary access has usually no effect on total coverage as regulation in monopoly areas remains in 
place). This effect is essentially due to the fact that investors here have full flexibility to maximise their 
profits.  
Voluntary access for co-investments is, however, not necessarily socially optimal, as it may lead to 
higher retail prices. The authors show that such deregulation of co-investments only provides higher 
welfare than no access in case services are sufficiently differentiated. Also, compared to regulated 
access, voluntary access only leads to higher welfare when services are highly differentiated and the 
compared access charge under regulation is high. The first result is obtained as the introduction of a 
freely and jointly profit maximising access charge by the co-investors may be used to soften 
downstream competition
69
. This may increase the co-investors total profits even in presence of a new 
entrant when compared to no access implying, however, less welfare. In the case where instead 
goods are highly differentiated, there would be no such negative competitive effects of deregulation 
and welfare would be enhanced. The welfare effects of voluntary access compared to regulated 
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 PON allows to passively bundle the traffic of multiple fibre lines on one single backhaul line, reducing feeder 
costs, but potentially limiting flexibility.  
68
 i.e. access is asked for after the investment is sunk and demand uncertainty has resolved 
69
 This is also described in BEREC(2012), where it is stated that compensatory mechanisms after the investment 
which imply effective above marginal cost access prices can be strategically used to reduce in the market.   
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access are then straightforward. Given sufficient differentiation (negative effect of co-investment on 
competition is weak) and a high enough access charge under regulation, local welfare in a 
deregulated co-investment area is higher than in a regulated single infrastructure area. Also, as has 
been shown, voluntary access would increase co-investment coverage. Therefore, only when 
differentiation is strong and the compared regulated access charges high may deregulation of co-
investments be a socially better choice than traditional access regulation. The French authority seems 
to share this view as it has actually not only regulated co-investment access conditions but also ex-
post access conditions to the infrastructure. Under the current regulatory framework, it may propose to 
lift this part of regulation when the co-investment grants sufficient competition therefore limiting 
negative effects on welfare.  
3.3.2. Co-investment models as an alternative to NGN 
regulation 
While the rest of the literature does not take geographical aspects explicitly into account, different 
aspects of the preceding model are also analysed when considering the presence of a legacy network 
on a whole considered, possibly urban area and upgrade investments which, depending on their size 
and the ability of the operators to sell quality services, may unlock additional willingness to pay.  
Overall modelling approaches in the rest of the literature vary strongly. For instance, Nietsche 
Wiethaus 2011, Cambini and Silvestri (2012) and Cambini and Silvestri (2013) compare different 
exogenous risk sharing agreement options (traditional joint-ventures and basic sharing) to - alternative 
- traditional NGN regulation options (LRIC, FDC, marginal cost, free market, no access). Unlike 
Bourreau, Cambini, Hoernig (2013) these authors consider an incumbent with an existing copper 
network to which all players have non-discriminatory access at marginal cost (regulated). Except for 
Cambini and Silvestri (2013), these papers take into account uncertainty. We will now review the rest 
of the literature, considering the following broad category of models: Presence of uncertainty, differing 
ability of partners to sell NGN based products and the presence of outsiders. Subsequently the access 
innovation literature is analysed where access conditions between the incumbent and the co-investor 
may differ and the NGN investment has no quality effect exclusively reducing access cost. Then, the 
literature on long term access regimes is reviewed under which the incumbent continues to fully 
control the network, while still being able in some cases to share risk. Finally, the empirical literature 
on co-investments is described.  
a) Certainty 
The simplest overall setting is provided by Cambini and Silvestri (2013) which consider a given roll-out 
area under certainty. Consumers’ willingness to pay for NGN depends on the amount of investments 
and the two considered possible incumbents are equally good in transforming quality investments in 
willingness to pay. They then rank market outcomes regarding investment, competition and welfare for 
the traditional joint venture case, the basic sharing case as well as the traditional regulated monopoly 
case. Cambini and Silvestri (2012) introduce also uncertainty making similar but more detailed 
conclusions considering in addition the case where NGN is left unregulated, while the legacy network 
is continued to be regulated. Nietsche and Wiethaus (2011) consider a similar model under uncertainty 
comparing the basic sharing case to specific regulation such as LRIC or FDC.  
In Cambini and Silvestri (2013), a downstream competitor has the possibility to enter a basic sharing 
agreement with the incumbent before the investment (ex-post access in case of agreement is granted 
for free for the partners, having to pay only their marginal costs for NGN). Duplication is therefore 
excluded. Investment costs as well as possible wholesale profits are as usual equally divided. 
Consumers are here having demand for basic broadband which can also be offered based on the 
legacy network and one for value added services based on NGN as in Foros (2004) and Katz and 
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Shapiro (1985). How much the NGN investment increases the consumers’ willingness to pay depends 
on the industry’s ability to transform input quality improvement into output.  
Essentially, two scenarios are analysed. One where all operators are part of the co-investment 
agreement and one where there are outsiders asking for usage based access ex-post. In the 
regulated scenario, Cambini and Silvestri (2013) assume that no type of investment sharing option 
exists and that the regulator sets the welfare maximising access price to the incumbents infrastructure 
(ex-post and linear usage based) for all access seekers. It is shown that in this case the optimal NGN 
access price is set at marginal cost (as for copper). The investment extent would then depend on the 
willingness to pay for NGN services and investment costs and it would decrease with the number of 
outsiders using access, as these would compete and reduce industry profits (Cournot). In equilibrium 
in the basic sharing scenario, instead, when all firms participate in it, industry profits and investment 
incentives are increased compared to the regulatory scenario as now also NGN profits generated by 
the co-investing (former downstream) competitor can be taken into account when making the 
investment decision. In this case the whole spill-over of the investment on the competitor can be 
considered when deciding on investment. Typically any other form of collaboration (e.g. ex-post 
access, especially when regulated) would reduce the amount of rent that can be extracted from the 
competitor reducing investment incentives as will also be shown in Inderst and Peitz (2013). Finally, in 
case of a traditional joint-venture, when firms are also free to choose the access price to the co-
invested network, competition can also be softened increasing profits and investment incentives even 
further.  
Equilibrium output it is shown to be highest under basic sharing. Firstly, it is higher than under joint 
venture, where partners may set a high access price to dampen downstream competition restricting 
output
70
. Secondly it is higher than under regulated access, even though access prices to the network 
are identical in equilibrium (marginal cost), as investment and therefore demand are increased under 
basic sharing. Finally, output under joint venture in equilibrium would usually be higher than under 
regulation (at least when willingness to pay for quality investments is sufficiently high and costs 
sufficiently low)
71
.  
It is also shown that the ranking with respect to total welfare in this model is identical. Increasing both 
investment and competition, basic sharing is superior to access regulation (similar conclusions will be 
described in Nietsche Wiethaus (2011) and Cambini and Silvestri (2013)). By contrast, a joint venture 
with freely chosen access charges is a combination between strongest investment incentives and  
strongest restriction of competition. Again, when willingness to pay for quality investments is 
sufficiently high and costs sufficiently low it is shown to be superior to regulation as in this case 
investment is having more welfare value. Finally, a joint venture option is shown to always generate 
less welfare than basic sharing as the increase in investment incentives in this model with an 
exponential cost function and Cournot competition can never compensate the loss in terms of 
competition. 
b) Uncertainty 
Nietsche and Wiethaus (2011) and Cambini and Silvestri (2012) introduce uncertainty such that 
willingness to pay is enhanced only in case of success. Conversely in the case of failure willingness to 
pay is not enhanced.  The binary nature of success allows to introduce the element of uncertainty 
without unduly extending the complexity of the model. In Cambini and Silvestri (2012) differently to 
Cambini and Silvestri (2013) and Nietsche and Wiethaus (2011) and following more closely Foros 
                                               
70
 . As stakeholders will be redistributed 50% of the JVs profits the access price would only have a financial 
impact on an operator when its use of the infrastructure would be different than 50%/50%; this is not the case in 
this symmetric and certain environment. However, otherwise a JV is vehicle for internal transfers (similar to full 
compensation payments in the Swiss case under loose cooperation agreements). 
71
 The ranking in terms of consumer welfare is identical. 
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(2004) the willingness to pay for quality of consumers may vary across firms. The results found under 
uncertainty are not in contrast with the results found in Cambini and Silvestri (2013) under certainty.  
Differing ability to increase willingness to pay of consumers across firms  
In Cambini and Silvestri (2012) again an incumbent with access to a legacy infrastructure has an 
option to invest in NGN under different possible exogenous regulatory regimes or a sharing option with 
a competitor. Demand is revealed only in the retail competition phase. Similarly to Cambini and 
Silvestri (2013) three access regimes are considered: Basic investment sharing, NGN regulation, and 
free NGN market. In all cases there a regulated copper option continues to be available.  
The incumbent and possibly the alternative operator in case of co-investment must decide on when to 
invest in a given (supposedly urban) area under consideration (investment extent is supposed to be 
100%). Investment costs are assumed to decrease over time
72
 meaning that the investment is 
becoming more profitable over time and that at some point investment would take place. Practically, 
an exponential discount factor (between 0 and 1) is applied to a (quadratic) investment cost as in 
Bourreau and Dogan (2005) and Riordan (1992), depending on the adoption date of the new 
technology. The earlier the investment takes places the higher the discount factor, and consequently, 
the investment costs that need to be incurred to upgrade the network
73
. The investor will decide 
therefore on the investment timing, which will determine the investment costs. Until the moment of 
adoption the incumbent makes profits based on its legacy copper network. The NGN generates profits 
afterwards. The regulator in this model sets access prices ex-ante, but access prices can be 
conditional (i.e. higher in case demand turns out to be high). In this model, it is mostly assumed that 
the entrant has to commit to an access regime and cannot switch back to copper after demand is 
revealed. It therefore bears risk as well.  
Under traditional NGN access regulation, it is shown that when the incumbent is much more efficient in 
creating willingness to pay for NGN services compared to the competitor, the regulator would set an 
expected welfare maximising price excluding the competitor from the NGN. This case is, however, 
assumed to be unrealistic. When the ability of the competitor increases slightly but the incumbent is 
still better than the competitor, the regulator would set an above marginal cost fibre access charge 
making its entry viable. Finally, when the ability of the competitor further increases and is only slightly 
lower than the ability of the incumbent, and when it is even higher, the regulator would set a negative 
access charge in case of success in order to incentivize the alternative operator to offer NGN based 
products, given that only its presence may unlock (quality) competition and possibly increased 
willingness to pay for NGN downstream. Negative access charges are, however, excluded and it is 
assumed that in such cases the fibre access charge would be set at marginal cost as copper. The 
authors also show that a situation where the regulator cannot set conditional access prices would be 
suboptimal, as the alternative operator could be inefficiently forced out of the NGN market in case of 
failure. This as above marginal cost NGN prices would be valid also in the case of failure and could 
imply that profits would be lower than with copper. Finally, the incumbent decides on the investment 
timing. The authors find that the better the competitor is on the fibre market the later the incumbent 
would invest (as in Foros (2004)). This occurs when the NGN access price is set at marginal cost, 
meaning that the investment is pure spill-over but also in the case of above marginal cost NGN access 
prices.  Also, when the probability of success increases, the investment is undertaken earlier and the 
incumbents’ incentives to invest decrease less strongly with the ability of the competitor.   
In the case of full deregulation of NGN a simple take-it-or-leave it offer is considered as opposed to 
Nash bargaining considered below by Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011). Moreover, it is assumed that in 
case of failure, the access price would be set at marginal cost. It turns out that the incumbent would 
set the NGN access price in case of success such that  
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 This means that in this model there is always investment at some point.  
73
 When investment takes place in period 0 the investment cost is not reduced at all. When taking place in period 
three it would be reduced by around 99%.  
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i) when the competitor is significantly less efficient in offering value-added services, it is 
excluded from the market    
ii) when the competitors’ ability increases but not up to a point where he would be significantly 
better than the incumbent, the incumbent will charge above marginal cost prices which just 
allow the alternative player to enter the NGN market.  
iii) when the competitor is considerably better, access is granted fully extracting the willingness to 
pay the incumbent would be unable to generate himself (monopoly prices). 
These conclusions differ from  Foros (2004), where the outside option is market exit (instead of 
copper) and the incumbent would charge an unconstrained NGN access prices excluding the entrant, 
whenever the competitor has a lower ability to sell NGN services. Here, the cases of exclusions are 
reduced as to make entry of the competitor viable even if it is (to some extent) less efficient than the 
incumbent. This is due to the trade-off that if it would not allow the entrant on the NGN it would 
continue to compete for basic services over the legacy network at regulated marginal cost access 
prices, which is creating an opportunity cost for the incumbent. Granting NGN access, the incumbent 
can at least earn some upstream profits, which if would not earn in case the competitor would continue 
to use the copper network. Lifting copper regulation would therefore substantially weaken the 
competitor’s position. Finally, in case of deregulation of NGN the authors find that the better the 
competitor is on the fibre market the earlier the incumbent would invest as here the incumbent can 
always capture part of the rent of the competitor.  
Under basic investment sharing, the two firms choose the investment time to maximize their joint 
expected profits. In equilibrium, when at the start the competitor is better than the incumbent (or when 
the incumbent is better but not too much), the investment is undertaken earlier when the competitor 
becomes better in selling NGN. Conversely when the incumbent is considerably better than the 
competitor an increase in the competitors ability would delay the moment of investment. This scenario 
is therefore representing an intermediate solution with respect to deregulation of NGN and regulation 
as it internalises the effects of retail competition. 
The authors conclude as the rest of the literature that basic sharing leads to more (or the same level 
of) competition and output than in case of NGN regulation (but also than NGN deregulation).The 
equilibrium in terms of time of investment depends on NGN access conditions and therefore on the 
firms respective abilities to sell NGN in the retail market. The investment is undertaken earliest in case 
of deregulation, while the ranking between NGN regulation and basic sharing depends on the 
parameters. When the regulated NGN access price is set to zero (marginal cost), the investment is 
undertaken later than under basic sharing as in this case investment costs can be shared. When the 
regulated NGN access price is positive instead, the relationship is ambiguous. Intuitively, while in case 
of investment the competitor may always profit from some spill-over effect, the incumbent may in case 
of deregulation also capture a part of this rent via the upstream market. In case of NGN regulation 
instead – if the incumbent has not a considerably higher ability to increase willingness to pay for NGN 
- the regulator would set prices at marginal cost decreasing the incumbents’ wholesale profits to zero. 
Investment incentives are therefore reduced and investments take place later. Finally, when the 
success probability increases the investments are in all scenarios anticipated. Uncertainty is therefore 
a major source for suboptimal investment.  
The interpretation in terms of total welfare of this model is unclear. When the competitor is better than 
the incumbent in providing NGN services (and a regulator would consequently set the NGN access 
price to zero), basic sharing is always the socially optimal choice. Even though investment incentives 
are lower than under NGN deregulation basic sharing more than compensates this in with the intensity 
of competition. Also, NGN deregulation is more efficient than regulation in this case. When instead the 
incumbent is better (but with the competitors’ ability not so low to be excluded) NGN regulation 
continues to yield lowest welfare, while the ranking of basic sharing and NGN deregulation is unclear. 
When the ability of the competitor is further reduced, the incumbent excludes it from the NGN market 
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in case of NGN deregulation. In this case basic sharing is better than NGN regulation from a welfare 
point of view, while the relationship between NGN deregulation and basic sharing is ambiguous.  
Equal ability to increase willingness to pay of consumer across firms  
Nietsche and Wiethaus (2011) use a similar but simpler model as Cambini and Silvestri (2012). The 
factor which transforms quality investments in willingness to pay in case of success is assumed to be 
one for both the incumbent and the competitor. When access to NGN is granted, both players are 
therefore supposed to be equally good at selling NGN products. Again the outside option is regulated 
copper access. The regulatory options considered are now detailed regulatory regimes. Under LRIC, 
the access price is considered to be an average investment cost per unit (marginal costs such as the 
cost of production and distribution are again sustained in addition by both the incumbent and the 
competitor). It is assumed, however, that if the investment is unsuccessful and no additional 
willingness to pay is created by the NGN investment, the NGN LRIC access price is set to zero. 
Therefore, only in case of success can the incumbent pass-on investment costs to the competitor 
under LRIC. In case of failure, the willingness to pay of consumers is not increased and the incumbent 
would continue to sell copper products under conditions as before and could not recoup its investment 
cost. Under fully distributed costs (FDC), instead, access prices are also defined as investment cost 
per unit. But here the incumbent is allowed to recoup costs also in case of failure (i.e. positive 
regulated NGN access charge also in case of failure). The form in which investment costs are 
recouped in case of failure can be by a forced full switch to fibre or by continued parallel services, 
whereby, however, copper based products have to contribute to cover the NGN investment cost. 
Finally, a basic sharing agreement is considered as well as a deregulated NGN environment. In the 
case of NGN deregulation negotiation for access to the network in case of success is modelled 
differently to Cambini and Silvestri (2012) as a Nash bargaining solution is assumed, meaning that 
rent extraction by the incumbent is more limited.  
Overall the authors show that in case of success competition is strongest in case of basic sharing 
where implicit access prices are lowest (in particular when compared to LRIC). As the equilibrium 
outputs in case of failure would be the same, overall expected quantities are increased with basic 
sharing. Moreover it is shown that LRIC leads to higher expected output than FDC, as the outcomes in 
case of success are equivalent, but as FDC would increase access costs for the competitor also in 
case of failure leading to lower output in this case. Finally, it is also shown that basic sharing 
generates more output than NGN deregulation as the latter leads to positive transfers in case of 
success.  
When looking at investment, given that output in this setting is always symmetric, with LRIC in case of 
success investment costs are effectively reduced by 50%. With FDC the entrant bears this share also 
in case of failure. Under basic risk sharing instead all investment costs are entirely sunk and do not 
allow any allocation of investments as second stage marginal access costs leading to a high level of 
retail competition and consequently limited investment incentives
74
. Basic sharing therefore induces 
less investment than both FDC and full NGN deregulation. The ranking between basic sharing and 
LRIC, however, is not entirely clear. As under LRIC the incumbent has to share the benefits of the 
network in case of success, but it cannot recoup or share investment costs in case of failure, the 
investment incentives strongly depend on the probability of success. In case of certainty for instance 
LRIC would provide better investment incentives than risk sharing. In case the probability of success is 
low enough (under 85%), however, basic sharing, turns out to induce more investments as it allows to 
share not only benefits but also investment costs upfront.  
The authors finally compare the performance of these regulatory options in terms of consumer welfare. 
It turns out that risk sharing is superior to LRIC both in terms of competition than in terms of 
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 The authors, however, admit that risk sharing may also have other forms allowing for such transaction and 
improving this trade-off. 
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investment incentives. This is, however, not always the case with respect to other regulatory options 
such as deregulation and FDC. In a numerical example, the authors show that usually expected 
consumer surplus for a large range of parameters (probability of success lower than 90%) is highest 
for risk sharing, followed by FDC, deregulation, and LRIC. The high performance of risk sharing is due 
to its property of leading to a very high intensity of competition, but at the same time giving reasonable 
investment incentives allowing sharing of both benefits and costs in all cases. It should be noted that 
risk sharing remains optimal even if the probability of success is above 90% and in a certain 
environment. In this case only the ranking between NGN deregulation and LRIC becomes unclear. 
Interestingly FDC dominates both NGN deregulation as well as LRIC. Apparently the higher 
investment incentives more than compensate lower competitive intensity. Furthermore, with some 
uncertainty even NGN deregulation appears to dominate LRIC (for a large set of parameters). This 
final result depends on the particular form of access prices under deregulation (Nash bargaining) and 
the hypothesis of competition. 
c) Outsiders 
The only paper next to Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2013) to consider ex-post outsiders in case of 
co-investment is Cambini and Silvestri (2013). In this case the insiders are able to set a (usage based) 
access price for outsiders which is potentially different from the insider fee. Results are however, not 
directly comparable as in Cambini and Silvestri (2013), as for the presence of a regulated legacy 
network option which changes the model fundamentally. Similarly, though the presence of an outsider 
undermines investment incentives, in particular in case of regulation.  
When an outsider is considered, in the basic sharing case the partners continue to access the 
infrastructure at marginal cost while the outsider has to pay a higher NGN access fee. The outsider 
also has the alternative possibility to use the copper network at regulated marginal cost prices (same 
as NGN) or to not enter at all. Given the demand structure, the more the partners invest in quality the 
less attractive is providing copper services for the outsiders. Depending on the extent of investment, 
the outsider may therefore be fully excluded from the market even though access to copper is 
regulated. In equilibrium the authors show that when willingness to pay for quality investments is 
sufficiently high and costs sufficiently low, the partners set an external access fee so high, that the 
entrant is excluded from the NGN network. Intuitively when the competitive advantage from fibre over 
copper services is large the temptation to exclude the entrant from the NGN is higher for the partners 
as profits in such a situation increase. It is also shown that under the same circumstances the partners 
choose an investment extent in the preceding stage which is high enough to exclude the entrant also 
from entering via copper (even though access is regulated at marginal cost), in which case the 
investment level is identical to the one under no access. When willingness to pay for quality 
investments is instead sufficiently low and costs sufficiently high, the partners set an above marginal 
cost access price which makes entry viable. One of the reasons the entrant is not excluded in this 
case is that it is simply not fully excludable when regulated copper access is granted at marginal cost 
and the willingness to pay cannot be significantly enhanced at reasonable cost. Once the entrant is 
not excludable, access can also be granted to the NGN, where more rent can be extracted.  
In the joint-venture case the partners instead choose the internal as well as the external access fee 
freely. When the willingness to pay for quality investments is sufficiently high and costs sufficiently low, 
the partners again exclude the outsider from the NGN via its access charge. In this case they would 
set their internal access charge at marginal cost in order to be able to compete at best on NGN base 
with the copper-based competitor. As before, however, in equilibrium the entrant is excluded also from 
copper based via investment extent when it is excluded from NGN based entry. In the converse case, 
the partners would set an outsider fee above marginal cost which would make NGN based entry for 
the competitor viable as well as an identical internal fee to overall soften (NGN) competition. The 
regulators intervention may here in both cases prevent discrimination and possibly foreclosure. It 
would again choose marginal cost access for all operators (insiders and outsiders), in which case the 
equilibrium investment under joint-venture would be the same as under basic sharing. French 
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regulation is largely in line with this observation as it foresees ex-post access for outsiders but  
includes a risk premium.  
Under a joint-venture the partners are again able to increase profits by reducing downstream 
competition. With outsiders, however, also under basic sharing some dampening of competition via 
the outsiders’ access fee is possible. This means that for a given investment extent output is highest 
and investment level lowest under regulation (uniform regulation at marginal cost). Also output under 
basic sharing is higher than under joint-venture. The rankings compared to the no outsider case is now 
different as the presence of an outsider implies that the insider fee is set low by the partners. In 
equilibrium Cambini and Silvestri (2013) show that with an outsider, sharing agreements increase 
investments incentives (even more under joint-venture than under basic sharing) over regulation but 
dampen competition further and lead more likely to exclusion. However, the benefits are such that total 
welfare is always enhanced by sharing models over the regulated case. The exact ranking between 
basic sharing and joint venture is unclear and depends again on the willingness to pay for NGN and 
investment costs. It seems therefore that notwithstanding the fact that sharing agreements can lead to 
a reduction of competition and potential foreclosure of outsiders this can be socially optimal when 
compared to a situation with NGN regulation at marginal cost which would reduce industry profits with 
every outside entrant. Regulators fears of a reduction of competition are therefore well founded when 
outsiders are present. Nevertheless they should consider that such regulation can reduce investment 
incentives to a point where welfare is decreased.  
3.3.3. Access innovation 
Some interesting insights can be obtained from the literature on cooperative access innovation. 
Mizuno (2009) considers access innovation representing investments with the effect of exclusively 
reducing network access costs
75
. While two firms compete à la Cournot with horizontally differentiated 
goods at the retail stage, in the investment stage, two exogenous options are considered. On one 
hand a non-cooperative regime in which the first moving incumbent alone determines the investment 
level maximizing its profits, and on the other hand a cooperative access innovation regime (joint 
venture) whereby the investment is chosen that maximizes joint profits of the incumbent and an 
entrant while sharing the fixed cost somehow and continuing to compete downstream. Unlike all other 
articles considered, the access fee the competitor has to pay ex-post is different from the one the 
incumbent bears. It has to continue to pay a usage based (linear) access fee which is set by the 
regulator.  
Under uncertainty in a benchmark scenario an unconditional regulated access price is considered 
which does not adjust to realized costs and is fixed. In this case, the investment incentives for access 
innovation are higher in case of no cooperation, as the entrant does not have any spill-over from the 
access innovation (results are reported in Table 4). Even worse for the entrant, the access innovation 
will lead to increased competitiveness of the incumbent reducing its market share and profits. In a 
more realistic scenario where the regulator imposes a conditional cost-based access pricing rule, the 
access charge is a fixed multiple (usually above 1) of the realized access cost ex-post (e.g. adding 
common non-traffic dependent cost elements as a fixed percentage of the access cost on top). 
Expenditure for access innovation investment may be also included in this perspective. Under any 
such access rule now access innovation and cost reductions by the incumbent also have a positive 
spill-over effect on the entrant as a reduction of the access cost also reduces the access charge and 
therefore the entrants marginal costs.  
When the spill-over effect (and access charge) is very small, the entrants’ access costs are reduced 
much less than the incumbents, leading to a strong competitive imbalance, given that the entrants’ 
costs increase relatively to the incumbents’. In this case the entrant overall does not benefit from 
access innovation and access charge reduction and it would in case of cooperation work to reduce 
                                               
75
 For simplicity it is assumed that the incumbents’ marginal costs are equal to average costs. 
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investments in innovation. A non-cooperative investment by the incumbent would therefore lead to 
higher investments. When the spill-over effect becomes high enough, the entrant also benefits 
sufficiently from access innovation and cooperative investment can increase investment over non-
cooperative investment. Finally, when the spill-over effect becomes very high, the entrant benefits 
more from the access innovation than the incumbent, whose overall benefits from access innovation 
may become negative due to competitive effects. No investment would then be undertaken as the 
entrant is supposed to be unable to invest alone. Access charges that are too high, therefore, contrary 
to intuition, do here not incentivize investment in access innovation but deteriorate it. This is however, 
only the case because of the particular regulated access price structure (fixed access rule). When the 
access charge is not a multiple of the access cost, but instead is set as a two part tariff, where non-
traffic related costs are set separately as a fixed ―set up‖ fee in addition to usage based charges, the 
scheme would represent a mix between a fix committed price and a marginal access cost rule implying 
that the limitation of investment incentives under the non-cooperative scheme are limited. The author 
suggests that regulators should therefore take care when structuring regulatory access products as 
incentives for both non-cooperative and cooperative access innovation can be distorted. Regarding 
the cooperation scheme per se it is not always effective but in case of a regulated (cost) conditional 
access charge it allows overall to enhance investment incentives. Also, given the above an increase in 
competition (goods becoming closer substitutes) reduces the range of regulated access charges (and 
spillover effects) for which cooperation is viable.  
 Cooperative access 
innovation 
Non-Cooperative access 
innovation 
Fixed usage based access 
charge 
Lower investment incentives Higher investment incentives 
Linear ex-post contracts with 
high spillovers 
Higher investment incentives Lower investment incentives 
Linear ex-post contracts with 
low spillovers 
Lower investment incentives Higher investment incentives 
Standard LRIC 
Higher investment incentives 
(Higher total welfare) 
Lower investment incentives 
(Lower total welfare) 
 
Table 4 – Investment incentives from non-cooperative and cooperative access innovation 
In the rest of the paper, the authors conclude that the usage based regulated access charge, 
considered the only instrument of the regulator, should be set below marginal cost in order to 
compensate for presumed market power at retail level both in the non-cooperative and cooperative 
regime.  When the access pricing rule is such that the access charge is equal to realized incremental 
access costs (e.g. LRIC) the level of spill-overs are shown to be ―large‖. It is then shown that such an 
access pricing regime would not only imply that cooperation leads to more investment incentives with 
respect to a non-cooperative regime, but also that under cooperation total welfare would be higher. In 
case of a two part tariff, it is shown that it might lead to higher investment incentives under the non 
cooperative scheme but also that it would not be welfare optimal in this context. 
3.3.4. Long term access agreements 
a) Certainty 
The co-investment options considered in the rest of this survey foresee joint profit maximisation. There 
are however, also possibilities to share investment risk without joint control. This is in particular the 
case with long term access agreements where a competitor may reach an agreement with the 
incumbent which foresees, for instance, a fixed unconditional ex-ante investment contribution in 
exchange for favourable ex-post access. Inderst and Peitz (2012a) as well as Inderst,  Kühling, 
Neumann  and  Peitz  (2012) analyse the effects of different access options including ex-ante long 
term access agreements to NGA in a certain environment. They derive critical levels of investments 
below which investment is undertaken under different access options. The outside option is again 
represented by regulated copper access at marginal cost.  
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Two operators are supposed to fully control a hinterland of particularly loyal customers beyond reach 
for the competitor and served exclusively. In addition, non-captive consumers are located on a 
Hotelling line with uniformly distributed customers and products are located at the two endpoints. In 
such a setting it is shown that the equilibrium price difference of the two products increases with 
differences in consumers’ gross utilities (or willingness to pay), marginal costs or the extent of 
hinterlands. It is, however, assumed that customers’ gross utilities only differ between the firms when 
they use different technologies. With given fixed, price independent hinterlands - and therefore 
industry demand - the authors note also that the property that firms can only set a uniform price for all 
customers (captive and non-captive), means that firms with a larger hinterland are less aggressive in 
the competitive segment holding a lower market share in this segment. In this analysis, however, 
symmetric hinterlands are assumed. Analogously equilibrium conditions are derived for the case when 
demand in the monopoly hinterland segments is price dependent (as well as consequently industry 
demand). The NGN investment decision takes place consisting in a 0-1 decision in a regional market 
(the incumbent deciding first on investment). In the following the different network access scenarios for 
the competitor are analysed under certainty (for a summary see Table 5). 
 
 Investment incentives 
(total coverage) 
Investment incentives 
(duplication) 
No access possibility Lowest Maximum 
Ex-post: Linear access 
charge   
Intermediate None 
Ex-post: Nonlinear access 
charge  
(full bargaining power with 
investor) 
Maximum 
 
Maximum 
 
Ex-post: Nonlinear access 
charge 
(not full bargaining power with 
investor) 
Intermediate 
(equal or higher than with 
linear access charge) 
Intermediate 
Ex-ante contract option  
(co-investment) 
Higher than corresponding 
ex-post option 
None 
 
Table 5 - Effect of access options under certainty (case of price independent demand) 
When no access possibility for the competitors exists, duplication may occur if investment 
requirements are very low. In the other extreme case, investment requirements are so high that not 
even a single operators’ investment is viable. In the intermediate case, only one of both firms’ 
investments is viable and only one firm invests in equilibrium. As a second option traditional ex-post 
access is considered. It is first assumed that access fees take the form of a linear charge per 
subscriber to recoup the investment and that the investor has full bargaining power.  
When industry demand is price independent, an increase in linear access prices above marginal cost 
is shown for the competitor to work like an increase in its marginal costs and leads to an equivalent 
increase in the retail price in equilibrium (see De Bijl and Peitz (2006)) as the whole marginal cost 
increase can be passed on one-to-one in equilibrium. The entrants profit remains therefore unchanged 
with changes in the level of the access charge. It is further shown that in equilibrium the same is true 
for the incumbents’ prices via opportunity costs. 
The incumbent would therefore be the only firm benefiting from this access price increase being able 
to extract rent from the entrant via higher wholesale profits. Foreclosure never happens in this case as 
the investor is able to always increase its profits through access, extracting rent generated by the 
entrant (competitors’ hinterland). Total coverage is therefore increased with an access possibility. 
Investment incentives are, however, not efficient here as the linear access charge determines jointly 
the level of industry profits and their distribution between the access seeker and the investor. Under 
this scheme the competitors’ net profits from access are the profits generated in duopoly at retail level 
(above wholesale cost). Duplication and a possible reduction of the competitors’ access cost to 
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marginal network costs
76
 would not impact the retail profits of the two firms, most importantly leaving 
the competitors’ total profits unchanged. Duplication at any positive investment cost is therefore never 
possible in such an environment. In addition, a change in the distribution of bargaining power has here 
no effects as the competitor is indifferent about the level of the access charge. 
When ex-post non-linear access prices are considered, for instance, not only a usage based charge 
has to be paid by the access seeker, but also a fixed charge. Compared to the linear access charge, 
more rent extraction would then be possible. As in a joint-venture, the usage-based access charge 
would then be chosen high enough to set marginal cost conditions such to maximise industry profits 
(monopoly outcome), while the fixed fee would allow the participants to divide the profits according to 
bargaining power between the two firms (in case of full bargaining power, extracting the entire 
additional profit, being largely equivalent to a joint venture). A two part tariff option therefore increases 
the investment cost that can be borne by the investor and investment incentives for total coverage 
when compared to standard linear access charges. When a shift in bargaining power is considered, it 
has no direct effect on the market outcome, but on the distribution of rents (and indirectly on level of 
investment). When not all of the bargaining power is with the investor, rent extraction and total 
coverage are lower. Regarding duplication, when the entrant does not invest on its own and uses 
access it has zero profits under nonlinear access in case of full rent extraction. The decision on when 
to invest in duplication is for the entrant then equivalent to the case when no access is possible. The 
probability of duplication is therefore the same. It is however, reduced when the incumbent has not full 
bargaining power. In the extreme case where the incumbent has no bargaining power no duplication 
takes place. The fixed charge is then zero and the resulting contract equivalent to an ex-post linear 
access contract. Overall, non linear contract types are therefore a useful instrument as they allow 
separating objectives maximising investment incentives. 
When industry demand instead is price dependent an increase in the linear access price leads to 
higher retail prices but also a decrease of demand for the access seeking firm and the investor. There 
is therefore no one-to-one pass through anymore creating an asymmetry between the firms as the 
investor in its hinterland incurs only its marginal network cost and not an (above marginal cost) 
opportunity costs. The incumbent will therefore charge a lower uniform price than the competitor and 
have a relatively higher market share in the competitive segment (partial foreclosure). This outcome is 
therefore different to the outcome an integrated monopolist (joint-venture) would prefer creating 
allocative inefficiency and reducing overall rent extraction. As a consequence, duplication can now 
occur as the competitors’ profits under duplication may be higher than under access given that lower 
marginal costs would now allow the entrant to increase its demand, especially in its own hinterland. 
When the access seeking firm increases its bargaining power, finally, the contracted linear access 
price will be reduced, leading to lower retail prices of both firms and a relatively higher market share of 
the access seeker. With non-linear access prices instead, again, higher investment incentives can be 
achieved. Setting a fixed charge, the incumbent can reduce the variable access fee returning to a 
more allocatively efficient and symmetric solution, while not being able to reach the joint venture 
allocation (as the incumbent cannot control the access conditions for both firms)
77
. An optimal 
allocation without necessitating a joint-venture allowing still full rent extraction could possibly be 
reached with an even more complex tariff foreseeing next to the fixed fee also the distribution of an 
adequately chosen ex-post lump sum transfer according market shares (similar to the ―compensation 
mechanism‖ proposed by some Swiss operators).   
Finally, when a linear or non-linear binding contract is instead signed ex-ante the competitor may 
commit to a usage-based and possibly also a fixed charge for access. When ex-ante negotiations 
break down, the outside profits depend on the outside option scenario (no access or linear or non-
linear ex-post NGN access). Under ex-post contracts, as shown, a hold-up problem may arise, where 
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 both operators would then face this access cost instead of the access price and there would be no wholesale 
market anymore 
77
 Changes in the bargaining power would here again not change the allocation. 
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not the entire rent can be extracted from the competitor in case the incumbent does not have full 
bargaining power. For the incumbent, the investment is then already sunk at the time of negotiation. It 
will therefore not be considered during an ex-post bargaining stage (e.g. Nash bargaining), the outside 
option being that only the incumbent offers NGN based products. When ex-ante contracts are used 
instead, investment costs are not sunk at the time of negotiation and the hold-up problem can be 
mitigated (and it even disappears with sufficiently complex contracts). Investment cost can therefore 
be shared somehow with the entrant. The option for an ex-ante contract correspondingly increases the 
incumbents’ profits under price independent demand, (weakly) increasing the range of investment 
costs that it can sustain and therefore total coverage when compared to the corresponding ex-post 
contracts. Also, duplication can be avoided, as under this ex-ante contract ex-post the fixed charge is 
already sunk not creating any incentive for duplication for the competitor.  Under price dependent 
demand, this result does not necessarily hold, as a reduction of the access cost from building own 
duplicated infrastructure can lead to an increase in the competitors’ demand, which may potentially be 
profit enhancing. In case where a fixed contribution is sunk, this reduces, however, such incentives 
also in this case. Duplication is therefore in any case more limited under ex-ante contracts. Overall, 
compared  to ex-post contracts (and no access), ex-ante contracts in general provide higher 
investment incentives (for total coverage) while minimizing duplication and dampening competition if 
the regulator does not put in place safeguards. This even occurs without considering uncertainty or 
risk aversion due to bargaining advantages. 
b) Uncertainty 
Inderst and Peitz (2013) consider a similar model as Inderst and Peitz (2012a), introducing uncertainty 
about the success of the investment. In addition, the effects of risk aversion and investment timing are 
analysed. Differently to Inderst and Peitz (2012a), however, duplication is a priori assumed to be not 
economically feasible facilitating the analysis.  
Uncertainty is here introduced by assuming that the NGN gross utility is drawn from a distribution 
function with values equal to (fail) or higher than the gross utility derived from copper (success to the 
extent of the utility difference). When both operators use the NGN with respect to the situation where 
copper is used, an increase in the gross utility of the NGN does affect price and profits only under 
price dependent demand.   
Table 6 summarizes the predicted effects of different access options on investment incentives under 
uncertainty and risk neutrality, assuming that granting access generates value (net increase in industry 
profits), i.e. that there is sufficient expansion of total demand and/or lessening of competition so that 
foreclosure is not an optimal strategy for the incumbent.  
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 Hold-up 
problem 
Usage of 
NGN by 
competitor in 
all cases 
Competitors’ outside 
option 
 
Overall NGN 
investment 
incentives 
Fixed access charges unconditional on NGN gross utility 
1) - Ex-ante contract 
 - Non-optional fixed charge 
unconditional on demand  
Efficient No 
- Incumbent NGN/copper 
- Competitor copper 
 
Intermediate 
2) -  Ex-post contract 
    (before realisation of demand) 
 -  Optional fixed charge     
    unconditional on demand 
Inefficient No 
- Incumbent NGN 
- Competitor copper 
 
 
Low 
Fixed access charges conditional on realisation of NGN gross utility 
3) - Ex-post contract 
   (after realisation) 
    - Optional fixed charge 
   conditional on demand  
Inefficient Yes 
- Incumbent NGN 
- Competitor copper 
Intermediate 
(maximum with full 
bargaining power) 
4)  - Ex-ante contract 
       - Optional fixed charge 
      conditional on demand 
Efficient Yes 
- Incumbent NGN 
- Competitor copper 
 
 
Maximum 
5) - No fixed charge 
    - Linear usage based charge  
Inefficient Yes 
- Incumbent NGN 
- Competitor copper 
 
Intermediate 
(but higher than 
unconditional fixed 
fee) 
6)  - No fixed charge 
     -  Nonlinear usage based charge  
Inefficient Yes 
- Incumbent NGN 
- Competitor copper 
 
 
Lower than 
than linear usage 
based charges 
 
Table 6 - Effects of different access options on investment incentives under uncertainty and risk 
neutrality 
Under non-optional fixed fees, the access seeker enters a binding ex-ante agreement on an access 
charge plan and there is no opt out possibility. It is assumed that after signing the contract a fixed 
charge (investment contribution) has to be paid by the competitor in any case and usage based 
access will be granted ex-post at marginal cost (as in all other cases below when a fixed charge is 
considered). The access seeker is, however, free to buy zero quantity after realization of demand, 
meaning that only the fixed charge is non-optional. The allocation on the retail market would then be 
the same as under duplication (symmetric) as both competitors would enjoy marginal costs access ex-
post. The fixed contribution can have two effects on coverage. In case the incumbents’ investment 
would be viable also without it (when the competitor would continue to use copper), total coverage is 
not affected. Access is still granted in this case as long as it creates added value for the industry 
(extension of total demand and/or lessening of competition). In cases when the investment without the 
investment contribution of the competitor is not viable, coverage is, instead, extended when compared 
to no NGN access. The operators will in this case be able to agree on an ex-ante fixed fee as long as 
industry profits under NGN (both firms) exceed industry profits under copper (both firms) by more than 
the investment cost (via extension of total demand and/or lessening of competition). Such a scheme 
does, however, not provide for maximum investment incentives as differently to optional plans 
described below the outside option for the competitor is in one scenario for the incumbent based on 
copper reducing the incumbents bargaining power and extractable rents
78
.  
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 It is also shown as an example that the access option of setting the non-optional ex-ante fixed charge at the 
investment cost multiplied by the expected market share of the competitor would not necessarily satisfy the 
participation constraint in the case when a single investment is not profitable but a co-investment is. There may 
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Under an optional unconditional fixed fee, the competitor has the possibility to seek access signing an 
access contract ex-post or also ex-ante, while it can then also opt out of the contract after uncertainty 
has resolved and it is known whether demand is high or low. The competitor will accept to pay the 
agreed fixed fee in case demand (gross utility under NGN) turns out to be sufficiently high. In this 
case, in fact, its copper based profits would otherwise be too importantly reduced by customers 
switching to the incumbents NGN products. Conversely, when demand turns out to be sufficiently low, 
the competitor will continue to use regulated copper access, which is socially inefficient, reducing 
competition and not allowing any rent extraction for the incumbent. When demand turns out to be 
higher than the level to make the competitors’ entry via NGN access viable, the competitor makes 
positive profits, which can, in addition, not be extracted by the incumbent with an unconditioned fee. 
The investor then receives the fixed contribution with the probability that demand realizes sufficiently 
high to make the NGN access contract viable for the competitor. If such a probability is low, the 
investor would have to increase the investment contribution to obtain a given fraction of the 
investment. But then again the level of demand necessary to sustain such a charge for the competitor 
increases, reducing the probability of success, and so on. In other terms, it may be impossible  for the 
incumbent to extract sufficient rent to sustain the investment with an unconditional charge. In addition, 
this scheme could (at least ex-post) not efficiently address a hold-up problem when the incumbent has 
not full bargaining power.  
The shortcomings of optional contracts can be overcome by conditioning the fixed charge on the 
realization of demand. When negotiations take place ex-post and after realization of demand for 
instance, the level of demand (NGN gross utility) can be observed and taken into account at the 
contracting stage, allowing an efficient adaption to market conditions and efficient surplus extraction. 
When the incumbent has full bargaining power it can extract the entire profits the competitor generates 
from upgrading to NGN under any realization of demand. NGN access is therefore here always 
provided as long as industry profits increase with the introduction of NGN as assumed initially. When 
considering full bargaining power rent extraction and efficiency is enhanced when compared to an ex-
ante unconditional access option where in one scenario the outside option is copper not only for the 
competitor but also for the incumbent. Under conditional (ex-post) contracts, instead, the outside 
option is always NGN for the incumbent, who has always already invested
79
, and copper for the 
competitor, putting the competitor in a weaker position. The extractable gross profit from access for 
the competitor is therefore higher under conditional optional contracts.  
As shown under certainty in Inderst and Peitz (2012a) with ex-post contracts the investment incentives 
for the investor are, however, reduced when it does not dispose of full bargaining power. Ex-ante 
contracts may solve also this hold-up problem. The same is true under uncertainty. Also, ex-post 
contracts were shown to be an efficient tool to extract rent as they can be fully conditioned on the 
actual realization of demand.  In principle, it is possible to combine both schemes introducing flexible 
ex-ante contracts depending on demand realization (as long as the level contracted upon is not only 
observable but also verifiable ex-post). An optimal access option could therefore be an optional ex-
ante contract conditioned on realised demand. In such a case, however, from a practical point of view 
a series of access prices would need to be defined ex-ante for all possible outcomes. Even though the 
negotiation here takes place ex-ante, the outside option considered is never that of no investment 
(where both firms use copper), as the situations defined in the ex-ante contract apply only to situations 
when the investment would have already been undertaken. In this case the same efficiency as with ex-
post contracts can be achieved with ex-ante contracts, while addressing in addition a possible hold-up 
problem. Compared to a non-optional ex-ante fee where in some cases the outside option consists in 
no investment by the incumbent and therefore relatively higher profits for the competitor when 
remaining on copper, the rent possibly extracted by the incumbent is therefore increased. When the 
outcome can be perfectly observed and verified an ex-ante conditional optional fee would therefore 
                                                                                                                                                   
therefore be cases where benefits and therefore the investment contribution would need to be distributed 
differently.  
79
 Or is foreseen to have invested.  
Seite 52 von 63 
 
provide the same investment incentives as an ex-post optional fee under full bargaining power. When 
instead the incumbent does not have full bargaining power the ex-ante optional conditional fixed 
charge is the most efficient tool to promote investment incentives, as it also addresses the hold-up 
problem. As will be seen in the next section, such an access scheme undermines, however, one of the 
main functions of a co-investment, which is to reduce the investors’ risk, as the investor would in this 
case need to bear a larger share of the investment cost when demand turns out to be low. In this 
scenario under risk neutrality this effect needs not to be considered.  
Inderst and Peitz (2013) also compare linear usage based charges, assuming that the fixed charge is 
zero. In this case, any access plan is optional as the competitor could always opt-out by buying zero 
quantity. As shown under certainty, when demand is price dependent, usage based charges introduce 
inefficient allocative asymmetries. Nevertheless, investment incentives compared to unconditional 
fixed fees with equivalent wholesale revenues are shown to be usually enhanced as usage based 
charges provide conditional wholesale revenues by construction. Also, corresponding non-linear 
usage based access charges can be considered. When still considering an access scheme that 
implies the same level of wholesale revenues than under the unconditional optional fixed charge and 
the linear usage based charge, a non-linear charge such as quantity discount leads to relatively lower 
access prices when demand is high and relatively higher access charges when demand is low. This 
has two effects. On one hand, this creates an incentive for both firms to increase outputs when they 
use NGN, reducing deadweight loss and enhancing competition compared to the linear charge. This 
usually would lead to lower profits and investment incentives though. On the other hand, when 
demand is realized to be low, access charges increase relatively, meaning that the likelihood that NGN 
is used by the competitor is reduced and that usage is less efficient. Overall, investment incentives 
seem to be lower in case of risk neutrality than with a corresponding linear usage based charge. In 
addition, negative quantity discounts could also be considered. This is for instance the case with 
capacity limits, where once reached, higher per unit access costs need to be paid. The conclusions 
are similar to positive quantity discounts. Capacity constraints could therefore be efficient to increase 
investment incentives. The authors finally consider a combined fixed and usage based charge under 
uncertainty. They propose a standard case of a non-optional fixed ex-ante fee and an ex-post optional 
usage based access fee. The usage based fee can as shown under certainty be used to relax 
competition in the retail market, increasing investment incentives, while the ex-ante non-optional fixed 
fee may be used to distribute rents especially when the incumbent does not have full bargaining 
power. However, with respect to the joint-venture outcome in case of price dependent demand, there 
continues to exist an allocative inefficiency.  
Risk averse firms consider profits less valuable when they are uncertain. The two competitors may 
also have different levels of risk aversion, for instance resulting from their varying ability to access the 
capital market. Inderst and Peitz (2013) then consider an ex-ante non-optional fixed fee (with the usual 
marginal cost usage based charge) and alternatively a linear usage based charge (above marginal 
cost) generating a priori the same wholesale revenues. In this case, when demand turns out to be 
high, it is shown that the investor has higher total profits under the usage based charge than under the 
fixed charge. Also, when demand turns out to be low, the investor would have lower profits under the 
usage based charge. The profit function of the incumbent under a usage based charge is therefore 
rotated with respect to profits under the fixed charge. The investors’ profits with a fixed charge over all 
possible outcomes of demand are therefore less risky than under usage based charge. The latter 
therefore shift more risk to the investor. Conversely, the risk the competitor would bear with a non-
optional fixed fee would be the same as the investors’. If regulation aims at balancing risks between 
market participants such an access option could therefore be desirable
80
 and depending on the extent 
of risk adversity of the incumbent this could increase investment incentives accordingly. When 
considering (unconditional) optional fixed charges instead the risk profiles changes radically. In this 
case when demand turns out to be low the competitor would opt not to ask for access. From a certain 
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 Abstracting from a possible foreclosure or late entrant problem.  
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level of demand, it would ask for access and pay the fixed fee. The investors profit function is therefore 
shown to have a discontinuity (increase) at some level of realised NGN gross utility. The level of the 
discontinuity depends on the level of competition. When there is weak competition (strong horizontal 
differentiation) the discontinuity corresponds nearly to the fixed charge implying a large revenue  risk 
for the investor.  
Finally, Inderst and Peitz (2013) also introduce a dynamic model, where demand for NGN in the 
market is expected to exogenously grow over time, meaning that operators may prefer waiting some 
time before investing. Investment can in a basic scenario be seen as an initial decision causing a 
number of periods of profits depending on the realisations of demand for NGN. Also, from the moment 
the competitor asks for access, it is supposed to need to pay a corresponding fixed charge also in 
each following period to access the network. This setting implies that there is an optimal moment for 
the competitor to invest and adopt NGN via access, the moment being determined by the paths of the 
access charges and gross profits. Introducing uncertainty about the NGN gross utility means that 
waiting is becoming an even more attractive option. But, as the NGN already exists, waiting is not 
socially optimal. Therefore, the fixed charge should be set low initially and rise over time. This could 
then be an efficient access option for ensuring earliest possible NGN adoption by the competitor while 
maximising investment incentives. In an additional scenario when the investor is allowed to dilute its 
investment over time and when cumulative investments are assumed to increases the likelihood of 
high NGN gross utility realisations, there may – under uncertainty - also be value of waiting for the 
investor, especially for risk averse investors. Comparing a fixed to a linear usage based fee in this 
context, it is shown that the latter may have an efficiency advantage over the former as it would 
increase with the competitors’ subscribers over time while fixed revenues would remain constant. For 
a given level of investment contribution, the usage based fee may, therefore, lead to relatively quicker 
investments and more efficiency.   
3.3.5. Empirical literature 
Empirical data on the effectiveness on new regulatory options such as co-investments is by definition 
not available. Krämer & Vogelsang (2012) provide, however, a laboratory experiment on the effects of 
a co-investment option in the market which can be empirically analysed. In their model two firms 
determine the coverage of their NGN networks in a Greenfield in three areas: metropolitan, urban and 
rural (respectively increasing in investment costs per household). Depending on the scenario a firm 
can roll-out independently or (partially) cooperatively. In subsequent ten stages firms compete 
repeatedly à la Bertrand in a retail market with homogeneous goods in all areas where they have own 
infrastructure or access (at a geographically uniform price). When the price of two operators is the 
same, customers are supposed to have a higher probability to choose the incumbent (75%). Access 
regulation (LRIC
81
) is exogenous and assumed to be in effect wherever only one firm is present. In the 
scenario without a co-investment option the incumbent first and then the entrant decide on their 
independent coverage. When instead a co-investments option is admitted, the two firms can, in a prior 
stage, agree bindingly on the area they will cover by co-investment (basic investment sharing, where 
the total investment cost for the infrastructure is assumed to remain unchanged). After agreeing on a 
co-investment, the operators again choose their independent coverage. Under these model settings in 
the last stage prices would in equilibrium be competed down to marginal costs and the market would 
be split. In a finitely repeated setting the unique equilibrium of the whole retail game is equivalent. The 
marginal cost to which prices are competed down includes, however, not only the average marginal 
cost for access on the other operators network but also the opportunity cost in form of an own 
(average) access price (represented by the average marginal cost for access for the other operator). 
This is the case, as giving up a customer implies that the operator does not have to pay an (average) 
access fee anymore, but that in turn it will receive an (average) access fee. Regarding the investment 
stage, under the independent investment scheme the authors find that the first mover advantage of 
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 Including a return on investment 
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the incumbent leads to an equilibrium such that it would cover all possibly profitable areas with own 
infrastructure anticipating that uncovered profitable areas would otherwise be covered by the entrant 
(in which case its overall profits would decrease as it would have to pay a positive ROI to the entrant 
for access). It is also found that the entrant having the same cost structure would find it unprofitable to 
invest in additional areas and that duplication is not feasible as the entrant would need to pay 
investment costs in own infrastructure without being able to obtain any additional profits (no wholesale 
profits and retail profits are always zero). In equilibrium, therefore, the incumbent rolls out as far as 
profitable alone and the entrant asks for access. In the investment stage under the scheme which 
foresees the possibility for co-investment the equilibrium outcome is surprisingly shown to be identical. 
As a co-investor, the entrant would have access to the infrastructure at marginal costs not needing to 
pay any ROI to the incumbent via an access charge. When deciding for co-investment, however, 
wholesale profits are the only real benefit of investment as retail prices are competed down to 
marginal cost. Any extent of co-investment would therefore reduce the overall profitability of the 
infrastructure. Thus, co-investment is fully avoided in equilibrium. After unsuccessful co-investment 
talks, the equilibrium outcome would then be the same as under independent investment with the 
incumbent covering all profitable areas and the entrant asking for regulated access.  
In a laboratory experiment the authors then tried to evaluate differences between these scenarios. In 
addition to the scenarios described the participants in the experiment were also exposed to an outside 
scenario under independent investment with communication where similar to the co-investment 
scenario they could communicate before the investment stage (but not make a co-investment 
contract). Such a scheme is unlikely to exist in reality. In both cases, however, participants could not 
communicate about prices (Chinese wall). In a first empirical model, a mixed-effects linear regression 
is used to test for differences in total coverage and collusion across different scenarios (Table 7). 
 Investment 
(total coverage) 
Intensity of 
Competition 
Co-investment option Intermediate Lowest 
Independent networks 
investment option 
Intermediate Intermediate 
Independent networks 
investment option –  
with limited communication 
possibility 
Maximum Intermediate 
 
Table 7 – Experimental results, effect of availability of options on competition and investment 
In a first econometric analysis, it is found that in an artificial scenario with independent investment, the 
possibility of communication leads to highest total coverage. The co-investment option scheme leads 
to less but not statistically significantly different total coverage, when compared to the standard 
independent investment scenario. Interestingly, even though not an equilibrium outcome under the co-
investment option, 56% of duopolies chose to co-invest. This could be motivated by the second result. 
The authors also use the model to test for differences in the average level of price collusion (over ten 
periods) in form of a simple Lerner index and a variant of the Lerner index measuring the deviation 
from average costs. The result shows that collusion is significantly higher in the scenario with a co-
investment option present when compared to the other scenarios. Finally, a three level model is 
estimated considering single periods. These regressions show that tacit collusion decreases towards 
the end of the game. The authors suspect, however, that this is due to the finite nature of the game. 
More importantly, it is shown that collusion increases from round to round. Therefore, the longer the 
participants are in the market, the more they learn to collude.  
In a second econometric analysis, the influence of actual market outcomes such as the share of co-
investment coverage (rather than differences in scenarios) on total coverage, prices and consumer 
welfare is estimated. The authors state that they did not impose any demand or cost shocks, meaning 
that differences in prices or total coverage could be caused only by the conduct of the firms (collusion 
and investment levels). They assume therefore the absence of any endogeneity problem and use 
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simple regressions where the explanatory variables are treated as exogenous. Such a fully exogenous 
setting is unlikely to be realistic and results could be unstable. The most important results seem 
however to broadly support to preceding analysis that the possibility of communication per se 
significantly increases coverage. Moreover, the share of co-investment coverage (excluding effects 
related to communication) would not increase total coverage. Regarding collusion it is found that the 
share of duplication as expected reduces the level of collusion while co-investment increases it (even 
net of communications effects). The authors see the latter effect as a mystery and speculate about a 
psychological result from a stronger bond between the two firms in the case of co-investment. Overall 
they show that consumer welfare can be increased via co-investment when regulators are able to hold 
these collusive effects somehow in check.  
3.4. Conclusion 
In this section the conclusions holding throughout the literature and possible future work in this field 
are described. Directly comparing the results of the theoretical literature is a complex task, as 
fundamentally different market models and co-investment agreement details are considered. Despite 
these differences, however, the conclusions and recommendations offered by the literature are 
surprisingly consistent.  
Generally, co-investment agreements are shown to always increase investment incentives in duopoly 
coverage when compared to no access, while usually not having an impact on total coverage. Total 
coverage can, however, be affected too with co-investment agreements when compared to the outside 
option, as  they can be used to reduce downstream competition (via internal and/or external access 
prices, by communication or other means), to extract more rent from access seekers, to extend total 
demand or in case of risk averse operators to share risks. The fine details of such agreements as well 
as of the considered outside options therefore matter.   
- Cambini and Silvestri (2013) show that under certainty and without outsiders, basic sharing is 
superior to NGN access regulation at marginal cost in terms of welfare, increasing both 
investment levels and competition, as the competitors’ profits may also be taken into account 
in the investment decision, thereby expanding network coverage at unchanged access 
conditions. These results remain valid when outsiders are considered even though co-
investment schemes can then lead to foreclosure.  
 
- Under uncertainty, without outsiders, when there is differing ability to increase willingness to 
pay of consumers across firms, this result remains substantially valid according to Cambini 
and Silvestri (2012). Basic sharing would still provide maximum output while investment 
incentives are reduced. When the regulator would set the access price at marginal cost, 
however, basic sharing would continue to provide also higher investment incentives. When the 
competitor is slightly better than the incumbent in selling NGN services (a regulator would then 
set the access price to zero), basic sharing continues overall to be the socially optimal choice. 
When instead the incumbent is (slightly) better, basic sharing is still a better choice than 
traditional regulation (but not necessarily than deregulation). Nietsche and Wiethaus (2011) 
find that with equal ability to increase willingness to pay of consumers across firms in terms of 
consumer welfare, this conclusion remains valid for different forms of access regulation such 
as LRIC or FDC.  
 
These different authors seem to agree that basic sharing may represent a valid alternative to 
traditional access regulation. A basic sharing option could in practice be implemented by imposing 
regulated conditions to NGA joint-ventures, which includes the imposition of an internal ex-post access 
fees and the split of investment costs. In substance, this is the regulatory scheme implemented in 
France. The question then arises, however, whether a solution where ex-post regulated NGN access 
to the infrastructure is continued in parallel to such regulation would not be an even better solution. 
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- From the literature only few conclusions can be obtained regarding co-investment schemes 
under a traditional usage based NGN access regulation environment. Bourreau, Cambini and 
Hoernig (2013) analyse such a setting, however, and conclude that with uncertainty and 
outsiders deregulation of basic sharing agreements (i.e. no ex-post regulation of the outsider  
access price) may be socially preferable to access regulation only when services are highly 
differentiated and the access charge under regulation would be high. This is the case because 
with outsiders dampening of competition takes place also under basic sharing. Nevertheless, 
there are some specific circumstances under which deregulation can be a welfare optimal 
solution in presence of such a co-investment scheme.  
Regulators should therefore consider the possibility of deregulation of co-investments and articulate 
ex-ante which detailed forms of co-investments would warrant which type of deregulation and under 
which external circumstances. In light of the above result it seems, however, likely that the introduction 
of a regulated co-investment option should usually be accompanied by continued traditional NGN 
regulation to hold excessive negative competitive effects due to the presence of outsiders in check
82
. 
This is also the approach the French NRA has chosen.  
- Regarding long-term access options Inderst and Peitz (2012a) show, under certainty, with 
price independent demand and full bargaining power that non-linear ex-post access fees can 
increase rent extraction over linear access prices to the point to reach investment incentives 
under monopoly (joint-venture). This is the case because under price-independent demand, 
no allocative inefficiencies from access arise. When instead industry demand is price 
dependent, there is an inherent allocative inefficiency, implying that under any form of (long 
term) access, investment incentives are reduced. Under these circumstances, a highly 
complex contract with lump-sum compensation payments based on ex-post market shares 
can possibly achieve replication of the monopoly outcome under full bargaining power and 
certainty. Finally, ex-ante contracts increase investment incentives for any tariff plan when the 
incumbent does not have full bargaining power, making rent extraction always more efficient.  
 
- Under uncertainty instead, Inderst and Peitz (2013) show that the above is no longer true and 
that fixed unconditional fees are inefficient as when demand turns out to be low the competitor 
would continue to use the copper network. Competition as well as investment incentives 
could, however, be enhanced when it would be given access at reasonable terms. Conditional 
fees are therefore more efficient in this case. Conditional fees can also be defined ex-ante 
(describing all possible outcomes), additionally addressing a possible hold-up problem. Ex-
ante optional conditional fixed fees are therefore the most efficient (fixed only) access option 
to promote investment incentives under risk neutrality. Finally, with risk aversion, it is shown 
that profits are less valuable when they are uncertain. When the investor is known to be risk 
averse and regulation aims at balancing risks between market participants a largely non-
optional ex-ante fee becomes again an interesting access option promoting investments.  
 
- The empirical literature is still limited. In Krämer & Vogelsang (2012) co-investment is not 
taking place in equilibrium due to unrealistically aggressive downstream retail competition 
assumptions when compared to the rest of the literature. Unsurprisingly, their experimental 
results suggest that such an equilibrium would not arise in reality and that operators may use 
co-investments as a means to increase collusion - even when the internal access fee is fixed 
at marginal cost and in presence of Chinese walls limiting communication. 
                                               
82
 It should be noted here that Cambini and Silvestri (2013) show that when considering basic sharing as an 
alternative to traditional regulation with outsiders, basic sharing would be preferable for regulators to access 
regulation (at marginal cost) even though this may imply foreclosure. 
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To conclude, also on the subject of co-investments many issues still remain to be explored. The most 
important flaw when comparing theoretical literature with applied regulation seems that multifibre has 
not yet received attention in academic research. Given the attention this roll-out option has received 
from regulators as well as Governments and the European Commission, future co-investment models 
should try to incorporate multifibre options. The main properties of multifibre, which could allow 
integration in existing models, are that it allows more flexibility and independence via IRUs when 
compared to traditional networks, that it enables consumers to purchase services from multiple 
providers simultaneously and that switching costs are reduced. More concretely, multifibre may allow 
physical infrastructure competition between the partners. In the existing literature usually under joint-
ventures a common access price to the infrastructure for outsiders is chosen by the partners jointly 
and under long-term access an incumbent is setting this price (alone). With multifibre instead both 
types of outsider access charges could be set independently by the two partners. In addition, another 
form of access debated by regulators has not yet received attention. Participation in a co-investment 
agreement could also be possible ex-post. Such a scenario seems particularly relevant in the 
multifibre case, where for instance in Switzerland two dedicated fibres (out of four) are today usually 
left unused. Also, the co-investment compensation mechanism described in the section on regulatory 
practice has been only broadly explored by Inderst and Peitz (2013). It should be analysed in more 
detail in a fully fledged model. Finally, there is yet no common framework to date that allows for 
instance a direct comparison of the Dutch co-investment case (joint-venture) to the predominant Swiss 
co-investment case (long-term access agreements).  
4. Concluding remarks 
This chapter integrates themes which have appeared throughout the text.  
- The review of practical cases has shown that by the end of 2013, European regulators 
continued to lack clarity on how to handle co-investment agreements and geographic 
regulation. At the time of writing, a wide variety of regulations were being applied. Their 
ultimate success will not be evident until several years after their implementation. To cite only 
the most extreme cases which have been reviewed:  
 
 While nearly all regulatory authorities continue to apply uniform access prices, the 
Dutch regulator imposes regional access prices varying with the extent of investment 
cost.  
 Regarding co-investment, on one hand, the Swiss regulator leaves full freedom to co-
investors to shape their NGN risk sharing agreements (as long as compatible with 
cartel law). On the other hand, the French regulator regulates all important clauses of 
such agreements (share of investment cost to bear, access price for insiders and 
outsiders, location of distribution point).  
 
- To date, there do not appear to be strong initiatives to address these issues at the European 
level. It is possible that this is the case as regulators, BEREC and the European Commission 
do not yet have a clear vision on these issues. This is understandable, to some extent, as for 
example the analysed effects of co-investment schemes depend on the fine details of such 
agreements and often also on market parameters such as the willingness to pay, investment 
requirements or potential industry demand expansion. While the economic literature on these 
topics is still limited, it seems, however, to clearly show that co-investment agreements with 
the right clauses can enhance welfare over traditional regulation at least in some cases and 
that exclusively uniform usage based access pricing may no longer be optimal. Future 
literature will likely further build on this and provide more stable insights. Nevertheless, it 
seems that regulators are now in a position to start to reflect on how to introduce and 
implement regional access prices and to promote co-investments. 
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Annex  
Table 8 - Theoretical analyses – geographic segmentation of remedies and geographic aspects of regulation 
 
Main Assumptions 
Main results 
 
Geographic 
difference in 
cost and 
competition 
considered 
Geographic
ally 
differentiate
d retail 
prices 
allowed 
Allow for 
geographically 
differentiated 
access prices 
(cost) 
Allow for 
geographically 
differentiated 
access prices 
(competition) 
Type of retail 
competition 
Entry 
Presence of 
old 
technology 
Remedies 
considered 
Case of free 
wholesale 
market 
Bourreau,  
Cambini, 
& Hoernig 
(2012b) 
 
Yes Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes, number of 
firms 
Bertrand, 
horizontally 
differentiated 
good 
Two 
potential 
incumbents 
and potential 
downstream 
entrants 
No 
-Access 
price 
regulation 
-Access 
obligation 
Yes. Bertrand, 
no differentia-
tion (at same 
prices access 
providing firm 
is chosen 
randomly) 
Cost-based geographic access prices lead 
to suboptimal roll-out and duplication and 
uniform pricing to too much duplication. The 
paper analyzes geographic regulatory 
instruments able to achieve the social 
optimum, e.g. geographically differentiated 
prices or remedies. 
De Matos 
& Ferreira 
(2011) 
Yes Yes Yes 
No (assumed to 
be competitive 
when investment 
costs are such 
to allow 
infrastructure 
competition) 
Cournot, 
horizontally 
differentiated 
good 
Endogenous 
(simulation) 
No 
Access price  
regulation 
No 
Different market outcomes with different 
access rates are simulated. Low access 
prices erode profitability of infrastructure 
providers. When regional markets interact, 
deregulation of more competitive areas may 
trigger a monopoly situation in an adjacent 
market. 
Flacher & 
Jennequi
n (2012) 
Yes No No No 
Cournot, 
vertically and 
horizontally  
differentiated 
good 
One 
potential 
infrastructur
e entrant, 
one potential  
downstream 
entrant (no 
duplication) 
Yes 
-Access price 
regulation 
-Coverage 
obligation 
Yes 
Show that regulation for maximize total 
coverage (full deregulation) is not optimal, as 
well as cost-based regulation to maximize 
static efficiency. Suggests that setting 
access prices and coverage obligations is 
optimal. 
Lestage & 
Flacher 
(2010) 
Yes Yes No No 
Bertrand, 
vertically 
differentiated 
good 
Two 
potential 
incumbents 
Yes 
- Access price 
regulation 
Yes 
A low access price may lead to areas having 
two equilibria, where it is not clear which 
operator would invest. It is then uncertain 
whether there will be investment. If the 
quality advantage of firm A is sufficient this 
problem disappears. 
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Table 9 – Theoretical analyses – NGN co-investments 
  Main assumptions 
Main results 
 
Cooper
ation 
type 
Paper 
Fixed 
investment 
contribution 
(share of 
investment 
cost) 
Usage based  
access 
charges for 
insiders 
Usage based 
access 
charges for 
outsiders 
Uncerta
inty 
Presence of 
legacy 
technology 
Effect of NGN 
Joint-
venture 
(JV) 
 
 
Cambini & 
Silvestri 
(2013) 
 
 
Yes, equal 
shares 
Yes 
(free choice) 
 
Yes, positive 
and higher 
than insider 
fee 
 
No 
 
Yes 
NGN increases willingness 
to pay (same for both 
firms) depending on 
investment extent 
Cambini and Silvestri (2013) show that without outsiders, basic sharing is 
superior to NGN access regulation at marginal cost in terms of welfare, 
increasing both investment levels and competition, as the competitors profits 
may also be taken into account in the investment decision, thereby 
expanding network coverage at unchanged access conditions. These results 
remain valid when outsiders are considered even though co-investment 
schemes can then lead to foreclosure.   
Cambini & 
Silvestri 
(2012) 
 
Yes, variable 
shares. 
Yes 
(free choice) 
- Yes Yes 
Chance that NGN 
investment increases 
willingness to pay (by 
same amount for both 
firms) 
Under uncertainty, without outsiders, when there is differing ability to 
increase willingness to pay of consumers across firms basic sharing always 
leads to more competition and output than with regulation or deregulation, 
while full deregulation induces the highest investments. From a welfare point 
of view, when the competitor is better than the incumbent in providing NGN 
services (and the regulator would consequently set the NGN access price 
under full regulation to zero) basic sharing is always optimal. When instead 
the incumbent is better, the ranking is less clear. Basic sharing usually 
continues to be optimal.  
 
Basic 
investm
ent 
sharing 
(particul
ar form 
of JV) 
Cambini & 
Silvestri 
(2013) 
(see above) 
Yes, marginal 
cost 
(see above) 
(see 
above) 
(see above) (see above) (see above) 
Nietsche & 
Wiethaus 
(2011) 
 
Yes, equal 
shares 
Yes, marginal 
cost 
- Yes Yes 
Chance that NGN 
investment increases 
willingness to pay (by 
same amount for both 
firms) 
Risk sharing (basic sharing) is shown to lead to maximum output and 
competition as well as to maximum consumer welfare, when compared to 
LRIC, FDC or deregulation, for its strong competitive effects and reasonable 
investment incentives allowing the operators to share benefits and costs 
upfront - even if ex-post the investment fails. 
Bourreau, 
Cambini & 
Hoernig 
(2013) 
 
Yes, equal 
shares 
Yes, marginal 
cost 
Yes, same as 
insider fee 
Yes No 
Demand for NGN can be 
high or low (same 
willingness to pay across 
firms) 
With uncertainty and outsiders deregulation of basic sharing agreements (i.e. 
no ex-post regulation of the outsider  access price) may be socially 
preferable to access regulation only when services are highly differentiated 
and the access charge under regulation would be high. This is the case 
because with outsiders dampening of competition takes place also under 
basic sharing. Nevertheless, there are some circumstances under which 
deregulation can be a welfare optimal solution in presence of such a co-
investment scheme.  
Krämer & 
Vogelsang 
(2012) 
Yes, 75% 
incumbent / 50% 
competitor 
(according to 
demand share) 
Yes, marginal 
cost 
- No No 
No quality effect, 
willingness to pay is 
identical for both firms 
Basic sharing is not taking place in equilibrium due to aggressive 
downstream retail competition assumptions when compared to the rest of the 
literature. Experimental results suggest that such equilibrium would not arise 
in reality and that operators may use co-investments here as a means to 
increase collusion - even when the access fee is fixed at marginal cost and 
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in presence of Chinese walls limiting communication. Overall the regulator 
can ensure positive effects on consumer welfare when the introduction of a 
co-investment option is accompanied by measures preventing collusion.   
 
Access 
innovati
on joint-
venture 
Mizuno 
(2009) 
Yes, variable 
Incumbent has 
access at 
marginal cost. 
Competitor 
has access at 
regulated 
prices (fixed 
multiple of 
marginal cost) 
- No No 
NGN investments have no 
effect on quality but can 
reduce marginal costs 
Under a regulated (usage) cost based access pricing rule when positive spill-
overs from access innovation on the entrant (via a high access charge) are 
sufficiently high, the entrant also benefits from a reduction in access costs. In 
this case the negative effects from competition (in this range the incumbents 
marginal costs decrease more than the entrants’) are sufficiently balanced. 
Then the entrant may participate in a cooperative investment scheme 
increasing overall investment incentives. The author moreover shows that in 
case of standard LRIC cooperation is enhancing total welfare. Finally he 
shows that investment incentives under no cooperation can be enhanced 
with a two-part tariff but that this would not be welfare optimal.  
Long 
term 
access 
Inderst & 
Peitz 
(2012a) 
- 
Incumbent has 
access at 
marginal cost. 
Competitor 
has access at 
possibly above 
marginal oost 
prices. 
- No Yes 
NGN increases 
consumers’ gross utility of 
the service (same amount 
for both operators). 
Under certainty, with price independent demand and full bargaining power 
that non-linear ex-post access fees can increase rent extraction over linear 
access prices to the point to reach investment incentives under monopoly 
(joint-venture). This is the case because under price-independent demand, 
no allocative inefficiencies from access arise. When instead industry demand 
is price dependent, there is an inherent allocative inefficiency, implying that 
under any form of (long term) access, investment incentives are reduced. 
Under these circumstances, a highly complex contract with lump-sum 
compensation payments based on ex-post market shares can possibly 
achieve replication of the monopoly outcome under full bargaining power and 
certainty. Finally, ex-ante contracts increase investment incentives for any 
tariff plan when the incumbent does not have full bargaining power, making 
rent extraction always more efficient.  
Inderst & 
Peitz (2013) 
 
- 
Incumbent has 
access at 
marginal cost. 
Competitor 
has access at 
possibly 
different 
access 
options. 
- Yes Yes 
NGN increases 
consumers’ gross utility of 
the service (same amount 
for both operators). 
Under uncertainty instead conclusions of Inderst and Peitz (2012a) are no 
longer true and fixed unconditional fees are inefficient. When demand turns 
out to be low the competitor would continue to use the copper network. 
Competition as well as investment incentives could, however, be enhanced 
when it would be given access at reasonable terms. Conditional fees are 
therefore more efficient in this case. Conditional fees can also be defined ex-
ante (describing all possible outcomes), additionally addressing a possible 
hold-up problem. Ex-ante optional conditional fixed fees (with subsequent 
access at marginal cost) are therefore the most efficient access option to 
promote investment incentives under risk neutrality. Finally, with risk 
aversion, it is shown that profits are less valuable when they are uncertain. 
When the investor is known to be risk averse and regulation aims at 
balancing risks between market participants a largely non-optional ex-ante 
fee becomes again an interesting access option promoting investments.  
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